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India’s semi-arid tropical (SAT) region is characterized by seasonally 
concentrated rainfall, low agricultural productivity, degraded natural resources, and 
substantial human poverty.  The green revolution that transformed agriculture elsewhere 
in India had little impact on rainfed agriculture in the SAT.  In the 1980s and 1990s, 
agricultural scientists and planners aimed to promote rainfed agricultural development 
through watershed development.  A watershed is an area from which all water drains to a 
common point, making it an attractive unit for technical efforts to manage water and soil 
resources for production and conservation. 
Watershed projects are complicated, however, by the fact that watershed 
boundaries rarely correspond to human-defined boundaries.  Also, watershed projects often 
distribute costs and benefits unevenly, with costs incurred disproportionately upstream, 
typically among poorer residents, and benefits realized disproportionately downstream, 
where irrigation is concentrated and the wealthiest farmers own most of the land. 
Watershed projects take a wide variety of strategies, ranging from those that are 
more technocratic to those that pay more attention to the social organization of 
watersheds.  By the mid-1990s annual expenditure on watershed development in India 
approached $500 million, but there was relatively little information available on the 
success of different project approaches. 
This study addresses three main research questions: 1) What projects are most 
successful in promoting the objectives of raising agricultural productivity, improving 
natural resource management and reducing poverty?  2) What approaches enable them to 
succeed?  3) What nonproject factors also contribute to achieving these objectives?  The 
major hypotheses are that participatory approaches that devote more attention to social 
organization yield superior project impact, and that favorable economic conditions and good infrastructure also support better natural resource management and higher 
productivity. 
A detailed survey of Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh states covered 86 villages 
under several watershed projects as well as nonproject villages with no project.  The 
projects covered operated under the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Rural 
Development, various nongovernment organizations (NGOs), and in collaboration between 
NGOs and the Government of Maharashtra.  The government projects were more 
technocratic in focus, whereas the NGO projects focused more on social organization, and 
the government-nongovernment collaborative projects tried to draw on the strengths of 
both approaches. 
The analysis of the Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh villages compared pre- and 
post-project conditions in the study villages.  Quantitative analysis at the village level 
addressed performance indicators such as changes in access to water for irrigation and 
drinking, change in employment opportunities, soil erosion and conservation on 
uncultivated lands and drainage lines, and change in availability of various products from 
the common (government revenue) lands.  At the plot level, performance indicators 
included changes in cropping intensity, change in yields, soil erosion on cultivated lands, 
farmers’ land improvement investments, and annual net returns to cultivation.  This 
analysis was supplemented by qualitative information about the effects of the projects on 
different interest groups in the villages such as farmers with irrigation, farmers without 
irrigation, landless people, shepherds, and women. 
Findings of the empirical study in Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh lend support 
to the hypothesis that more participatory projects perform better than their more 
technocratic, top-down counterparts, and that a combination of participation and sound 
technical input may perform the best of all.  Evidence about the role of economic 
conditions and infrastructure is more limited. 
Despite rhetoric to the contrary, successful participatory projects remain few in 
number so their impact is limited.  In the study area in rainfed areas of Maharashtra’s 
Pune and Ahmednagar districts, for example, the innovative projects operated in only 40  
 
 
out of over 1000 villages, even though they are particularly highly concentrated in this 
area compared to the rest of India.  Also, the most successful projects enjoyed special 
treatment that will be difficult to replicate on a large scale.  Spreading participatory 
watershed development throughout the country will not be easy. 
One continuing challenge for almost all projects is in designing interventions and 
organizing communities so that benefits are distributed more evenly to landless people, 
shepherds and women.  These are the least influential community members and their 
needs and interests require special attention.  Otherwise watershed projects can actually 
make them worse off than before by restricting their access to resources that contribute to 
their livelihoods.  Unstructured interviews with these groups suggested that all of the 
Maharashtra projects have room for improvement in serving their needs.  Some NGOs in 
Andhra Pradesh have developed innovative ways to build everyone’s interests into the 
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
 
Rainfed agriculture in India’s semi-arid tropics (SAT) is characterized by low 
productivity, degraded natural resources, and widespread poverty.  Most of the hundreds 
of millions of people living in the Indian SAT depend on agriculture and natural resource 
management for their livelihoods, so development planners are eager to implement 
productive, environmentally sustainable land and water management systems. 
Watershed development projects are designed to harmonize the use of water, soil, 
forest and pasture resources in a way that conserves these resources while raising 
agricultural productivity, both through in situ moisture conservation and increased 
irrigation through tank- and aquifer-based water harvesting.  Watershed projects have 
become widespread in rainfed areas in recent years, with a current annual budget from all 
sources that exceeds US $500 million (Farrington et al. 1999).  This study examines the 
experience of watershed projects in Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra.
1 
The literature on watershed development in India is growing rapidly, but most of 
it is confined to qualitative descriptions of success stories.  Some of these contain 
excellent insights into the social processes that contribute to successful watershed 
development, but there is little frank discussion of less successful projects.  The few 
quantitative studies available tend to be based on a small number of heavily supervised 
projects, with no information about long-term impacts.  Benefits after the first year or two 
                                                 
1 This study was originally conducted under the Indian Rainfed Agricultural 
Research and Development Project, jointly sponsored by the World Bank and the Indian 
Council of Agricultural Research.  That project also included a companion study on 
watershed development that reviewed the literature on watershed projects and drew upon 
the findings of a rapid rural appraisal of new projects in Karnataka, Rajasthan, and Orissa 






were typically assumed and, not surprisingly, cost-benefit findings were almost always 
favorable.  At the same time, the vast majority of projects were never subject to 
evaluation and there were good reasons to suspect that most of them had little impact 
(Kerr and Sanghi 1992). 
With this background, the current research was commissioned to analyze the 
determinants of agricultural productivity, natural resource management and poverty 
alleviation under a wide range of watershed projects.  The study is mainly quantitative 
but also incorporates qualitative data, explicitly examining the effects of non-project 
factors such as infrastructure, access to markets, social institutions in the villages, 
agroecological conditions, etc.  This broad framework not only controls for the effects of 
these factors but also enables identification of other policy-relevant determinants of 
improved natural resource management and economic development.  It also discusses the 
approaches taken by different projects in order to understand the essential elements of 
successful projects and make recommendations for the future.  To summarize, the study 
addresses three related questions: 1) which projects perform the best, 2) what approaches 
enable them to succeed, and 3) what additional characteristics of particular villages 
contribute to achieving the objectives of improved natural resource management, higher 
agricultural productivity and reduced poverty.  
 
OUTLINE OF THE PAPER 
After introducing the problem and presenting a conceptual framework in Section 
1, Section 2 describes the broad approaches to watershed development in Maharashtra 
and Andhra Pradesh and introduces the specific projects operating there.  Section 3 
describes the data on which this study is based, and Section 4 presents the analytical 
model.  Characteristics of villages in which each project operates are analyzed in Section 
5, while Sections 6-8 analyze project performance in terms of achieving various 
objectives related to agricultural productivity, natural resource management and poverty 
alleviation.  These include the work conducted by watershed projects on protecting and 






agricultural land, and raising agricultural production.  These sections also analyze the role 
of nonproject factors, such as infrastructure development, on outcomes of interest, and 
they examine watershed project activities in relation to villagers’ development priorities.  
Section 9 concludes with policy implications and recommendations. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
Two main hypotheses guided this research.  One is that watershed projects cannot 
succeed without full participation of project beneficiaries and careful attention to social 
organization.  This is because the costs and benefits of watershed interventions are 
location-specific and unevenly distributed among the people affected.  The second 
hypothesis is that a variety of factors determine the incentives for people to manage and 
protect natural resources and invest in increased agricultural productivity.  These factors 
may have as great an impact as a watershed project in determining the outcomes that 
projects seek to achieve.  The issues underlying these two hypotheses are explained next. 
 
Watershed Management as a Social Organization Problem 
A watershed (or catchment) is a geographic area that drains to a common point, 
which makes it an attractive unit for technical efforts to conserve soil and maximize the 
utilization of surface and subsurface water for crop production.  A watershed is also an 
area that contains administrative and property boundaries, lands that fall under different 
property regimes, and farmers whose actions may affect each others' interests.  Human-
defined boundaries, however, normally do not match biophysical ones.  In watershed 
management projects, mechanical or vegetative structures are installed across gullies and 
rills and along contour lines, and areas are earmarked for particular land use based on 
their land capability classification.  Cultivable areas are put under crops according to 
strict principles of contour-based cultivation.  Erosion-prone, less favorable lands are put 
under perennial vegetation.  This approach aims to optimize moisture retention and 
reduce soil erosion, thus maximizing productivity and minimizing land degradation.  
Improved moisture management increases the productivity of improved seeds and 






Excess surface runoff water is harvested in irrigation or percolation tanks while 
subsurface drainage recharges groundwater aquifers, so conservation measures in the 
upper watershed have a positive impact on productivity in the lower watershed.  
Reducing erosion in the upper reaches also helps to reduce sedimentation of irrigation 
tanks (ponds) in the lower reaches.  The watershed approach enables planners to 
internalize such externalities and other linkages among agricultural and related activities 
by accounting for all types of land uses in all locations and seasons.  This systems-based 
approach is what distinguishes watershed management from earlier plot-based 
approaches to soil and water management. 
Socioeconomic relationships among people in a watershed can complicate efforts 
to introduce seemingly straightforward technical improvements.  This is because, as 
mentioned above, a watershed contains multiple decision-makers whom watershed 
development affects unequally.  When a watershed project is introduced, often the bulk 
of the work is done in the upper reaches while the benefits accrue primarily in the lower 
reaches.  For example, revegetating the upper reaches involves banning grazing and 
felling trees so that plants can establish.  As a result, the people who utilize the upper 
watershed—typically relatively poor people with little or no land—bear the brunt of the 
costs of watershed development, which mainly benefits wealthier farmers in the lower 
watershed.  Those who are made worse off by a watershed project can undermine its 
efforts if they refuse to go along with it.  Herders, for example, might refuse to abide by 
grazing bans and trespass on the common lands if they are able to.  In general, watershed 
technologies are likely to fail if they divide benefits unevenly but require near-universal 
cooperation to make them work.  In this case, equity becomes a prerequisite to efficiency 
(Kerr and Sanghi 1992).  
While early watershed projects failed to recognize the socioeconomic dimensions 
of watershed development, this has changed significantly in the last decade.  In recent 
years there has been a growing appreciation of the need to organize communities to work 
collectively, make sure that beneficiaries have an interest in the work that is done, and 






to include the “participation” of local people; however, they all defined “participation” 
differently.  For government programs, typically it meant making the effort to convince 
people of the soundness of an approach that was essentially pre-designed without any 
input from those who would be affected.  Taking people's involvement a step further, in 
such projects local committees were established to mobilize laborers for moving earth 
and planting vegetation, and to facilitate communication within the village to improve the 
management of common lands.  On the other extreme, many new projects operate under 
the assumption that local people know best how to care for their land and simply need 
outside assistance to help them organize and gain access to resources, including funds 
and social services. 
Approaches to participation are discussed in detail in Section 2, and implications 
of alternate approaches for project outcomes are revealed by the analytical findings 
presented in Sections 6-8.  Based on these findings and various observations from the 
field, recommendations for how projects should pursue participation in the future are 
presented in Section 9. 
 
How Economic Forces Can Determine Project Outcomes 
As mentioned above, performance in improving agricultural production, natural 
resource management, and human welfare depends on economic factors beyond the 
control of a watershed project.  Throughout the world, both today and historically, it is 
easy to find areas with a broad range of performance in agricultural growth, natural 
resource management and poverty alleviation.  For example, evidence abounds of areas 
in India with stagnant agricultural production, low real incomes, and environmental 
degradation.  On the other hand, both the literature and folk wisdom are full of examples 
of places in India where villagers manage their natural resources particularly well and the 
local economy is unusually vibrant.  What determines why some areas are more 
productive than others? 
Induced innovation theory helps explain the conditions under which agricultural 






Induced innovation theory holds that, over time, technological innovations and 
institutional changes take place to economize on scarce resources and utilize abundant 
ones (Hayami and Ruttan 1984).  The theory helps explain why traditional farming 
systems have evolved differently in different places.  For example, in sparsely populated 
areas traditional farming systems were bush-fallow, with forest land being cleared and 
farmed for a few years before being left for 20 to 30 years of nutrient-restoring fallow.  
On the other hand, in land-scarce areas such as the intensive rice growing areas of 
Southeast Asia, elaborate terraces, irrigation systems and nutrient management systems 
enabled continuous cultivation without degradation.  In the widely cited case of 
Machakos, Kenya (Tiffen et al. 1994), rising population density, good access to markets 
and off-farm income created incentives and provided resources to raise productivity and 
conserve natural resources. 
In India, farmer-led agricultural intensification is also widespread.  In semi-arid 
areas the most obvious example is that of private irrigation investments, which are 
typically accompanied by land leveling and application of substantial organic matter and 
commercial inputs.  On rainfed lands the successes are less dramatic, but evidence shows 
that private tree planting has grown steadily in recent years (Chambers et al. 1989), and 
that many farmers invest in indigenous soil and water conservation measures 
independently of special project efforts (Kerr and Sanghi 1992).  Likewise, some villages 
have designed social institutions for managing common property resources in ways that 
raise their productivity and protect against long-term resource degradation (Wade 1988). 
Several exceptional case studies of successful watershed development have been 
well-publicized in India, but the common perception is that they remain just that: 
exceptional.  Success is often attributed to the efforts of a charismatic leader or some other 
set of social conditions that would be difficult or impossible to replicate on a wide scale.  
There is undoubtedly a great deal of truth in this perception, but to date there has been little 
systematic effort to examine the extent to which policy-relevant factors have played a role 
in causing some areas to be characterized by better resource management and higher 






Siddhi (Hazare et al. 1996) and Sukhomajri (Chopra et al. 1990; Patel-Weynand 1997), are 
there village-level or regional differences in natural resource conditions, agricultural 
productivity and household incomes that can be explained by induced innovation theory? 
From the induced innovation perspective, assessing the performance of watershed 
development projects requires examining the effects of such factors as market access, 
population density and the economic policy environment.  Induced innovation theory 
suggests that if market access is favorable and population density is high, people will be 
more receptive to projects seeking to conserve soil resources and intensify agricultural 
production.  In fact, even in the absence of a special project, the economic environment 
may be sufficient to induce farmers to adopt resource-conserving, productivity-enhancing 
technologies.  On the other hand, even a well-designed watershed development project 
might be unable to achieve long-term success if enabling conditions are lacking.  In such 
a case, farmers would have insufficient motivation to adopt and maintain practices 
needed to promote sustainable agricultural intensification.   
 
ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
This study examines performance in improving agricultural productivity, natural 
resource management, and human welfare.  Data on performance indicators, which are 
described in subsequent sections, come from a survey of 86 villages reflecting a variety of 
project approaches, including villages with no project.  Quantitative data collected at the 
village, plot and household level provide the basis for econometric analysis of the 
determinants of changes in pre- and post-project conditions.  Open-ended discussions 
provide further qualitative information on the impact of projects on people from various 
interest groups, such as farmers with and without irrigation, livestock herders, etc.  
This research was originally designed to examine only completed projects where 
the staff had withdrawn.  However, despite the large literature on watershed development 
in India, the number of projects in which work has actually been completed is quite 
small, so the intended approach was not feasible.  Instead, the study covers mainly well-






Selection Criteria under each Project 
The criterion by which each project selects participating villages is of critical 
importance to the present analysis.  If, as argued above, numerous factors can determine a 
village’s performance in agricultural production and natural resource management, then it 
is important to know how these factors are distributed across villages in different project 
categories.  Otherwise, if villages in different project categories vary in their endowment of 
factors that can affect performance, then it is difficult to know whether to attribute 
differences in performance to project activities or to the effects of pre-existing village 
characteristics.  For example, Pitt et al. (1993) describe a case in Indonesia that showed that 
villages covered for several years under a major family planning program actually had 
higher fertility rates than those outside of the program.  One could jump to the conclusion 
that the family planning program had failed miserably, but Pitt et al. explain that the 
difference was not surprising given that the program consciously worked in villages where 
fertility had been higher to begin with.  In the absence of the family planning program, the 
difference in fertility between the two sets of villages might have been even greater. 
An analogous situation could apply in the present study since programs may 
choose to operate in particularly favorable or unfavorable villages, either intentionally or 
unintentionally. 
Section 2 describes each project in detail, including its rules for selecting villages.  
In Section 5 the data are analyzed to assess the extent to which different projects adhere 
to their published guidelines and to identify any other factors that may characterize 
villages under each category.  
Project Categories Covered in the Analysis 
All categories of projects operating in Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra are 
covered by this research.  They include the following: 
￿ Ministry of Agriculture (MOA): projects that focus primarily on technical 
aspects of developing rainfed agriculture.  These include the National 






Council of Agricultural Research’s Model Watershed Projects, and the World 
Bank-assisted Pilot Project for Watershed Development in Rainfed Areas.
2 
￿ Ministry of Rural Development (MORD): Engineering-oriented projects that 
focus on water harvesting through construction of percolation tanks, contour 
bunds, and other structures.  These fall under the Maharashtra Department of 
Soil and Water Conservation projects (Jal Sandharan) and the Drought Prone 
Area Project (DPAP).
3 
￿ Non-government organizations (NGOs): projects that typically place greater 
emphasis on social organization and less on technology relative to the 
government programs. 
￿ NGO-Government collaboration: projects operated jointly by government and 
non-government organizations (Indo-German Watershed Development 
Programme (IGWDP), Adarsh Gaon Yojana (AGY)) that seek to combine the 
technical approach of government projects with the NGOs’ orientation toward 
social organization.  These projects are found in Maharashtra but not Andhra 
Pradesh. 
￿ Control: villages with no watershed project. 
All of these project categories are discussed in detail in the next section. 
 
                                                 
2 The more recent World Bank-assisted Integrated Watershed Development 
Project (IWDP) did not operate in either Maharashtra or Andhra Pradesh, so it is not 
covered in the quantitative analysis.  This paper draws on other analysis of that project, 
including a companion to this study by Kolavalli (1998), to discuss this later generation 
of World Bank watershed projects. 
3 In 1995, the DPAP guidelines were restructured under radical new, participatory 
guidelines.  However, only pre-reform DPAP projects are included in the quantitative 
research since little progress had been made in implementing the new guidelines at the 
time of the fieldwork for this research.  Other studies including Kolavalli (1998) and 






2.   APPROACHES TO WATERSHED DEVELOPMENT IN MAHARASHTRA 
AND ANDHRA PRADESH 
 
This section begins by describing the agroclimatic characteristics of the study 
region and characterizing two alternative technical approaches that have been used in 
watershed development.  It then describes each of the projects covered in this study, 
focusing on their guiding principles and the relative emphasis on social organization 
compared to technical assistance.  There is also a discussion of how each project selects 
the sites where it works, the amount of money they invest, and their policies regarding 
cost-sharing with intended beneficiaries. 
 
AGROCLIMATIC CONDITIONS IN MAHARASHTRA AND ANDHRA PRADESH 
Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh both have highly diverse agroclimates.  In 
Maharashtra, a narrow coastal plain separates the Arabian Sea from the Western Ghat 
Mountains.  On the eastern side of the mountains, the majority of the state is spanned by 
the large Deccan Plateau, which covers much of south-central India.  Rainfall is very high 
in the coastal mountains, but the western part of the Deccan Plateau (in the rain shadow 
of the Ghats) is very dry.  The wettest district of the Western Ghats receives an annual 
average rainfall of over 4000 mm, while the driest areas of the rain shadow zone (only 
about 150 km to the east) receive about 500 mm.  The topography of this transitional 
zone from wet to dry is a series of tablelands, or flat plateaus that drop sharply to plains 
below.  Conditions for rainfed agriculture in the driest zones are difficult, and this is 
where watershed projects are most concentrated.  Moving toward eastern Maharashtra, 
average annual rainfall rises gradually to over 1000 mm, making conditions for rainfed 






Figure 1: Map of Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh States, India 
 
Andhra Pradesh contains similar diversity.  The long coastal plain along the Bay 
of Bengal receives over 1000 mm average annual rainfall, and much of it is irrigated by 
the major canal systems of the Krishna and Godavari rivers.  Moving west from the coast 






on the Deccan Plateau are divided into the Rayalseema and Telengana regions.  
Rayalseema is the southernmost part of the state; it is highly drought prone with average 
annual rainfall as low as 500 mm in some areas.  South Telengana (which is south of 
Hyderabad) is also drought prone, though not to the same extent, with average annual 
rainfall in the 600-700 mm range.  Both Rayalseema and south Telengana vary in their 
topography, with small hills and valleys that are suitable for traditional irrigation tanks 
that capture runoff from rainfall for lowland irrigation.  The predominantly red soils of 
these regions also favor tank irrigation.  North Telengana (which is north of Hyderabad), 
on the other hand, is flatter, has black soils, and receives around 800-1000 mm average 
annual rainfall.  Conditions are much better for rainfed agriculture, comparable to the 
conditions across the state border in eastern Maharashtra. 
Thus, rainfed agriculture in both states varies between areas of high and low 
potential and this heterogeneity has important implications for the approaches to 
watershed development. 
 
HOW DIFFERENT PROJECTS APPROACH RAISING AGRICULTURAL 
PRODUCTIVITY 
There are fundamental differences between watershed projects that focus on 
developing rainfed agriculture and those that focus on increasing access to irrigation. 
 
Projects that Focus on Increasing Irrigation 
In western Maharashtra, the scarcity of water and favorable topography make 
water harvesting a high priority and the focus of most projects.  Where plateaus slope 
down to the plains, there are many opportunities to capture water behind small dams for 
irrigation in the flat lands below.  Soils in these areas are relatively porous and favor 
percolation of harvested water into groundwater aquifers; it must be pumped for use as 
irrigation.  By contrast, in Telengana and Rayalseema regions of interior Andhra Pradesh, 
irrigation tanks store water on the surface for irrigation by gravity. 
Agricultural engineering to build and protect water-harvesting structures is the 






mainly check dams in drainage lines and continuous contour trenches in the uncultivated 
catchment areas.  Since almost all the structures are built on nonarable lands with 
common access by all village inhabitants, the projects also promote collective action to 
protect vegetation in the catchment area.  This reduces erosion and limits the silting that 
would reduce the storage capacity of water harvesting structures. 
In these projects there is relatively little focus on plot-level management.  This is 
because once irrigation is in place, farmers have sufficient knowledge and incentive to 
manage a plot and improve its productivity.  Rainfed agriculture is a low priority where 
projects are successful in increasing irrigated area.  For example, Shri Anna Hazare, 
known as the “father” of watershed development in the well known success story of 
Ralegan Siddhi, explained that watershed efforts there focus exclusively on increasing 
irrigation and protecting nonarable lands.  Virtually no attention is paid to developing 
rainfed agriculture (personal communication 1996).  This approach has proven highly 
successful in Ralegan Siddhi, where irrigated area went from virtually zero to about 70% 
of the cultivated land over the last 25 years.  Average annual rainfall is barely 500 mm, 
so conditions are not favorable for rainfed agriculture.  Project designers clearly perceive 
that the real payoffs in such areas lie in irrigation development. 
 
Projects that Focus on Rainfed Agriculture 
In areas with limited opportunity for water harvesting, watershed projects 
typically devote more attention to developing rainfed agriculture.  This is the situation in 
eastern Maharashtra and northern Andhra Pradesh, where the terrain is flatter and the 
climate less arid.  Watershed projects in these areas promote on-site soil and water 
conservation measures that improve the resource base for rainfed agricultural production.  
This is intended to pave the way for adoption of crop varieties that are responsive to 
increased moisture.  These projects often build water harvesting structures such as check 
dams and percolation tanks, but they cannot offer the spectacular increases in irrigation 
achieved in places like Ralegan Siddhi, because the terrain does not provide the same 






In southern Andhra Pradesh, the most obvious opportunities for water harvesting 
have long since been exploited in the form of traditional irrigation tanks.  Some 
opportunities remain, but often they lie in the catchment of an existing tank, thus 
interfering with the traditional system.  This helps explain why most projects in Andhra 
Pradesh focus more on rainfed agriculture than irrigation.  (The DPAP is the exception.) 
Table 1 lists the projects in the sample area according to their primary orientation 
toward water harvesting vis-à-vis rainfed agricultural development. 
 
 
Table 1: Primary orientation of projects in the study toward either water harvesting 
or rainfed agriculture 
Primary orientation of the technical work  Projects and locations 
Primarily water harvesting  ￿ DPAP (with pre-1995 guidelines) and Jal 
Sandharan, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh 
￿ NGOs in Maharashtra 
￿ Adarsh Gaon Yojana and Indo-German 
Programme (government-NGO collaboration) 
Primarily rainfed agriculture  ￿ NWDPRA, both Maharashtra and Andhra 
Pradesh study sites 
￿ World Bank Pilot Project 
￿ ICAR Model Watershed projects 
Both rainfed agriculture and water 
harvesting 
￿ NGOs in Andhra Pradesh 
 
 
PROJECTS COVERED UNDER THIS STUDY 
Government Projects that Focus Primarily on Water Harvesting 
This discussion of the different watershed projects operating in the study area begins 
with the project sponsored by the Government of Maharashtra, because the Maharashtra 
projects represent the roots of watershed development in India.  The Jal Sandharan program 






Watershed projects in Maharashtra:
4  The elements of watershed development 
date back to the 1942 Bombay Land Improvement Schemes Act.  This initiative 
resembled modern watershed projects in its focus on soil and water conservation, 
improved rainfed farming methods, and controlled grazing.  Watershed management 
gathered momentum in Maharashtra following the severe 1972 drought.  The 
Government of Maharashtra launched the Employment Guarantee Scheme (EGS), which 
aimed to provide work to anyone who needed it while also creating permanent assets 
such as infrastructure.  One important objective was to “drought-proof” the land by 
building water harvesting structures that would provide drinking water and irrigation 
throughout the year. 
In 1982, the Government of Maharashtra initiated the Comprehensive Watershed 
Development Program (COWDEP).  This program was intended to combine the 
budgetary resources of the EGS and the technical provisions of the 1942 Bombay Land 
Improvement Schemes Act for a large-scale watershed development effort.  One notable 
problem was that work undertaken by COWDEP was administered by several 
government departments, and coordination among them proved to be difficult. 
Following COWDEP and other experiments in watershed development, the GOM 
launched the Jal Sandharan Program in 1992.  It represents an effort to take a more 
comprehensive approach to watershed development, with the key innovation being that the 
four government departments involved in the work were brought under one umbrella.  The 
Jal Sandharan, which became a department in itself, would also handle the funds from the 
centrally-sponsored Drought Prone Area Program (DPAP), Jawahar Rojgar Yojana (JRY), 
and National Watershed Development Project for Rainfed Areas (NWDPRA). 
The Jal Sandharan program treats the village as the unit of planning, 
implementing the work in microwatersheds that lie within village boundaries.  Emphasis 
is given to raising the water table to protect and enhance drinking water sources and 
provide protective irrigation for at least one crop.  The program is implemented by a 
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committee at the district level representing all the government agencies involved in the 
project.  The work in each selected village proceeds with the consent of the village 
sarpanch (elected leader) after a meeting of villagers is held to discuss the project. 
The Jal Sandharan shows the signs of lessons learned from several decades of 
state government experience in watershed development, but it also shows clearly the 
difficulties of coordinating large-scale activities across government departments.  In 
particular, coordination in the upper levels of bureaucracy does not always translate into 
coordination at the village level, where all the departments involved have separate 
budgets and targets (Pangare and Gondhalekar 1998). 
Drought-Prone Areas Programme: The Drought Prone Areas Programme 
(DPAP) is sponsored by the Ministry of Rural Development in the central government.  
The DPAP can be traced back to the Rural Works Programme initiated in 1971-72.  It has 
evolved gradually over time, initially covering a wide range of labor-intensive activities 
such as soil and water conservation, afforestation, and development of irrigation and 
infrastructure.  Over time the program gradually focused more sharply on area 
development for drought-proofing.  By the late 1980s, the DPAP became exclusively a 
watershed development program focusing on soil conservation, water harvesting, pasture 
development and afforestation.  A small amount of funds were earmarked for associated 
activities such as livestock development, sericulture and horticulture. 
As with other government-funded watershed programs, the DPAP was strictly a 
technical program in which local people played little or no role.  Many NGOs, 
meanwhile, had moved toward a more fundamentally participatory approach in which 
villagers shared in developing and implementing watershed plans.  In 1995, the Ministry 
of Rural Development adopted this approach on the basis of the well-known Hanumantha 
Rao Committee Report (GOI 1994a).  Under the guidelines subsequently drafted, (GOI 
1994b), plans were to be developed by the villagers, with an emphasis on the use of local 
technologies.  Funds would go directly to the village, with villagers working hand in hand 
with an independent project-implementing agency that could come from the government, 






the physical target orientation that characterizes most government programs.  This radical 
restructuring of the program has taken time to operationalize, and by 1997 almost no 
work had been undertaken in Maharashtra.  Progress was better in Andhra Pradesh, but 
insufficient work had been done to warrant analysis of any post-1995 DPAP villages.  As 
a result, this study covers villages covered by the DPAP in its pre-1995 guidelines.  In 
Maharashtra the pre-1995 DPAP is synonymous with the COWDEP and Jal Sandharan, 
and in Andhra Pradesh the approach is very similar.  In fact, before the implementation of 
the new DPAP guidelines the Jal Sandharan drew most of its budget from the DPAP. 
 
Government Projects that Focus Primarily on Rainfed Agriculture 
While the water harvesting and afforestation approach to watershed management 
was gathering momentum in Maharashtra and in the DPAP, alternate approaches were 
being introduced that focused more on developing rainfed agriculture through on-site soil 
and water conservation practices.  These approaches were led in India by on-station 
research undertaken by the Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR) institutes 
such as the Central Research Institute for Dryland Agriculture (CRIDA), and also by the 
International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT).   
Indian Council of Agricultural Research Model Watersheds: In the mid-1980s, 
ICAR decided to implement the findings of its dryland agricultural research in 47 model 
watersheds around the country.  Many of these pilot sites were treated as research 
watersheds, where the work undertaken was closely monitored and changes in land and 
water conditions were analyzed.  Physical costs of the watershed works were relatively 
low, but supervision was intensive, with persistent efforts to introduce new varieties and 
other improved technologies and management practices. 
CRIDA took up three such watersheds in Andhra Pradesh.  One of them, 
Chevella, is included in the present study.  The other two, both of which are close to 
Hyderabad, could not be included because they have since been converted to housing 
developments.  At least one model watershed was launched in Maharashtra, but it was in 






World Bank Pilot Project for Watershed Development in Rainfed Areas: The 
World Bank Pilot Project for Watershed Development was initiated in 1984 in Karnataka, 
Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh.  Like the ICAR model watersheds, 
this project sought to introduce improved rainfed agricultural technology.  The project’s 
guiding philosophy was that low-cost soil and water conservation measures, including 
improved agronomic practices like contour cultivation and vegetative rather than 
mechanical bunds, could make a strong contribution to rainfed agricultural development 
at a relatively low cost (World Bank 1988).  While the work was undertaken on a 
watershed basis, additional emphasis was given to proper treatment within each plot as 
the project’s design team felt this was missing from the watershed approach pioneered in 
western Maharashtra.  A major thrust of this program would be to promote contour-based 
cultivation, which would conserve soil and concentrate moisture at very little monetary 
cost.  The improved soil moisture regime in turn would make improved seeds, fertilizers 
and other inputs more productive. 
The project also applied lessons learned from earlier projects regarding 
institutional approaches.  Efforts were made to streamline state government operations to 
support the project; special offices were established at both the central and state level in 
order to coordinate the administrative needs of the project. 
Like other early government projects, the Pilot Project aimed for universal 
implementation of a single, centrally-developed plan, with efforts made to convince local 
people of its merits. The project document stressed the need to adapt proven technologies 
to local conditions, but in practice there was little flexibility.  Techniques not pre-
approved under the project were not supported.  Concerning pasture development and 
afforestation, it was recognized that the work would have no lasting impact unless people 
supported it; accordingly, no pasture development work would be undertaken without 
local people’s consent.  But that was about the extent of participation.   
When the Pilot Project ended in 1991, a second phase of the World Bank project 
was introduced.  This project was called the Integrated Watershed Development Project 






project was undertaken in Rajasthan, Orissa and Gujarat.  The IWDP, representing the 
next generation after the World Bank Pilot Project, took essentially the same approach to 
developing rainfed crop production as the earlier project.  Its main difference was that it 
focused greater attention to developing and strengthening local organizations as the 
means of garnering people’s participation and collective action for protecting common 
pasture areas.  The project’s administrative approach was also restructured.  Project 
evaluations suggest, however, that the IWDP suffered from the same problems of poor 
participation and inflexible technology choice as the Pilot Project (ICRISAT 1996; RAU 
1999; personal communication with Director of Watersheds, Rajasthan).  Since the 
present study is confined to Andhra Pradesh and western Maharashtra, the analysis 
addresses only the Pilot Project. 
National Watershed Development Project for Rainfed Areas: The National 
Watershed Development Project for Rainfed Areas (NWDPRA) is the Ministry of 
Agriculture’s counterpart to the World Bank-funded Pilot Project and IWDP.  Similar in 
approach to the World Bank projects, the NWDPRA promoted the same low-cost 
vegetative bunding techniques and contour-based cultivation.  Vegetative and other low 
cost measures were also used in the nonarable lands (Government of India 1991a).  The 
NWDPRA is centrally funded and operates through state-level Departments of 
Agriculture or Watershed Development.  In 2000, the NWDPRA adopted the MORD’s 
more participatory guidelines, and in the coming years the two projects are to be 
implemented with common guidelines.  This study covers villages developed under the 
NWDPRA’s earlier approach. 
Another similarity to the World Bank projects is that the NWDPRA works on a 
watershed basis, where watersheds do not necessarily correspond to village boundaries.  
The NWDPRA watersheds are only about 500-5000 ha, or around 5-20% of the area of 
the World Bank watersheds.  As a result, the NWDPRA watersheds typically cover one 
village entirely or nearly so, plus parts of one or two neighboring villages.  This approach 
is considered to make the most sense from a land and water management perspective, but 






village administrations in one relatively small area.  Also, organizing local institutional 
arrangements for managing nonarable common lands is complicated when working 
across village boundaries.  The World Bank Pilot Project and IWDP shared this same 
problem and had difficulty in making it work (ICRISAT 1996). 
The NWDPRA project guidelines mentioned the issues of people’s participation 
and institution-building, but they presented no clear strategy and only a small budget for 
addressing them (GOI 1991a).  It appeared that the project’s intentions were in line with 
modern views about the benefits of participation but that the mechanisms for ensuring 
them were not fully developed.  This is discussed further in Kolavalli (1998). 
In western Maharashtra, implementation of the NWDPRA was strongly influenced 
by the fact that the project was implemented by the same agency that plans and implements 
the engineering-based approaches of the COWDEP, Jal Sandharan and DPAP.  In particular, 
the primary focus remained on treating drainage lines and catchment areas to promote 
infiltration of water.  One of the most notable differences was simply that the technologies in 
use were much less expensive.  For example, drainage line structures under the NWDPRA 
contained no cement and were limited to a maximum cost of Rs 25,000 per structure, 
whereas under other projects individual water harvesting structures might cost seven or eight 
times as much.  As a result, water harvesting was not the NWDPRA’s strength. 
In Andhra Pradesh, the NWDPRA was operated by the Department of Agriculture 
and more clearly matched the approach envisioned in the project guidelines. 
 
Nongovernment Organizations: A Focus on Social Organization 
NGO programs are by no means uniform, but they share the common feature of a 
strong emphasis on social organization.  Their guiding principle is that without proper 
social organization, efforts to introduce watershed technology will be fruitless. 
The two features that most distinguish NGO watershed programs from government 
programs are their scale of operations and their staffing structure.  While government 
programs have huge budgets and work in hundreds of villages, most NGOs work in only a 






variety of activities in addition to watershed management.  Second, while government 
employees concerned with watershed management are almost exclusively trained in 
agricultural sciences and engineering, NGO staff members include many more 
nontechnical staff trained in community organization.  They believe that social organization 
contributes as much to successful watershed development as technical input.  Some NGOs 
collaborate with government agencies that provide technical expertise, but others do not. 
It is important to note that NGOs vary a great deal.  Some are large and well 
established, with access to substantial funding, whereas others are smaller, less 
experienced, and underfunded. 
NGOs in Maharashtra:
5 Watershed management in Maharashtra has roots in the 
nongovernment sector that go back nearly as far as those in the government programs.  In 
the early 1980s two villages became well known for their watershed management 
programs: Ralegan Siddhi in Ahmednagar district and Adgaon in Aurangabad district.  
Many current government and NGO initiatives draw inspiration from them. 
In the 1970s, Ralegan Siddhi was a poorly developed village almost devoid of trees 
and grass and a haven for liquor dens.  Anna Hazare emerged as a local leader and brought 
about various social changes in the village, particularly family planning, a ban on alcohol, 
protection of nonarable lands against open grazing and felling of trees, and shramdan, or 
voluntary labor for community welfare.  Around the same time he also learned about the 
benefits of soil conservation and water harvesting.  The social changes brought order and a 
sense of community to the village, while soil and water conservation work (implemented 
by COWDEP) and protection of the common lands helped restore the natural resource 
base.  This was the beginning of people’s participation in watershed development. 
Among the many NGOs working in watershed development in Maharashtra, one of 
the best established is Social Centre, founded in Ahmednagar in 1969 by Jesuit priests.  
Between the period 1969-1988, it was engaged in various activities such as small loans, 
community lift irrigation schemes, community health programs, etc.  In 1988 it shifted its 
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focus towards motivating and organizing entire villages to undertake ecological regeneration 
of their own watersheds.  The Social Centre played a key role in launching and designing the 
statewide Indo-German Watershed Development Programme, discussed below. 
NGOs in Andhra Pradesh: NGOs in rural Andhra Pradesh have traditionally 
focused on the problems of lower caste communities.  Caste structure is more 
dichotomized than in Maharashtra, with more villages in which one or two large land 
owning families control large tracts of land while many others remain landless.  As a 
result, NGOs typically focused on non-land based activities such as developing and 
strengthening local credit institutions.  With the rise of watershed development as a focal 
point for rural development, some NGOs gradually adopted it into their project portfolio 
(Sanghi personal communication).   
In recent decades Andhra Pradesh has had successive waves of large-scale 
privatization of common lands in which landless and near landless people were given 
legal but nontransferable title to formerly common lands (Pender and Kerr 1999).  Many 
NGOs expanded their work from credit and other income generation activities to support 
agriculture on the privatized land, much of which is of low quality.  As they expanded to 
a watershed approach they also began to work with other farmers with higher quality 
land.  But their primary orientation toward helping poor, landless people means that these 
watershed agencies tend to be more committed to making landowners pay for work done 
on their own property.  For example, while most projects in Maharashtra and the centrally 
funded government programs typically ask for no more than a 10% contribution from 
farmers for work done on their private lands, some NGOs in Andhra Pradesh require a 
more substantial contribution for work done on private lands.  Some of the implications 
of this policy are discussed below, in the discussion on land improvement investments. 
One interesting difference between the works conducted by MYRADA, an NGO 
operating in Andhra Pradesh, and that by the Maharashtra NGOs is MYRADA’s greater 
focus on trying to build consensus among different interest groups in a watershed.  As 
discussed above, the costs and benefits of watershed development can be spread 






socioeconomic diversity is relatively high.  MYRADA addresses this problem by trying 
to organize communities to develop mechanisms to compensate those who lose so that 
they will go along for the greater good (Mascarenhas et al. 1991; Fernandez 1993, 1994).   
In all of its rural development projects, MYRADA organizes people in small, 
homogeneous groups to work toward one common purpose.  In the context of 
watersheds, the first step is to work in "miniwatersheds" of no more than a few hundred 
hectares and a hundred farmers.  Second, MYRADA helps form small subgroups of 
farmers based on homogeneity of location, socioeconomic conditions or interests.  These 
groups all belong to a larger miniwatershed group.  This preserves the participatory and 
socially functional character of the smaller, homogeneous subgroups while also retaining 
advantages of scale in planning watershed works and interacting with government 
agencies, banks, and input suppliers.  The larger group provides a vehicle for airing 
complaints and settling disputes among people from different subgroups. 
 
Government-NGO Collaborative Programs in Maharashtra 
The most intriguing aspect of watershed development in Maharasthra in recent 
years is the rise of collaborative programs between government and non-government 
agencies.  The two main examples are the Adarsh Gaon Yojana (Ideal Village Scheme, or 
AGY), and the Indo-German Watershed Development Programme.   
Adarsh Gaon Yojana:
6 The AGY is a major initiative that seeks to replicate the 
Ralegan Siddhi model in 300 villages by combining the technical staff of the Jal 
Sandharan program with the social orientation of NGOs. 
The key elements of the AGY are government-NGO collaboration and strict 
guidelines for social organization.  Villages participating in the AGY must undertake to 
follow the five social principles of Ralegan Siddhi: family planning, a ban on alcohol, a 
ban on open grazing, a ban on cutting trees, and shramdan.  The idea is that adherence to 
these five principles can lead the village towards self-sufficiency by helping them meet 
their needs for water, food, fuel and fodder within their own village.  The philosophy also 
                                                 






promotes a set of values that encourages self-discipline and a willingness to overcome 
social barriers and political factionalism to work for the common good.
7 
Shramdan is intended to foster a spirit of self-sufficiency and self-dependence.  
The idea is that when villagers observe the benefits of the physical works carried out for 
watershed development, it gives them a sense of satisfaction and achievement.  They also 
feel responsible for the maintenance of the structures for which they have invested their 
own labor.  Shramdan is also seen as a good way of getting people together to work for 
the welfare of the entire community. 
Nongovernment organizations play an important role in the AGY.  People in each 
village select a local NGO to help them implement the different development activities 
and adhere to the social principles.  The NGO also maintains records and accounts, and 
monitors the project activities.  In addition, the NGO coordinates with the government 
departments at the state level to access funding and technical guidance.  The Jal 
Sandharan Department, meanwhile, implements the technical work. 
Funds under the project are to be used for two main types of activities, namely, 
watershed development (the core activity) and other development activities (non-core 
activities).  The latter are carried out by the government agencies in question, as listed 
above, in consultation with the people of the village.  Government departments are 
supposed to give AGY villages preference in providing services.  Steps are undertaken to 
reduce corruption and peripheral expenses. 
Indo-German Watershed Development Programme: The Indo-German 
Watershed Development Programme (IGWDP) is another example of collaboration 
between government and nongovernment organizations that seeks to scale up the success 
of small NGO programs (Farrington and Lobo 1997; WOTR 2000; NABARD 1995).  
Initiated in 1993, the IGWDP develops microwatersheds in a comprehensive manner 
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considered culturally appropriate.  In other areas, other means of promoting cooperation 
and social discipline may be preferred.  In southern Rajasthan, for example, Seva Mandir 
insists that villagers reverse all illegal encroachment on common lands before they will 






through the initiative taken by village groups.  Its guiding philosophy is the need for 
collaboration among village level organizations, NGOs skilled in social organization, and 
government organizations skilled in technical work.  Further, it accepts that although 
indigenous knowledge and practices are important, they need to be augmented by modern 
techniques and management practices.  The IGWDP has developed elaborate procedures 
to cut through bureaucratic turf wars and red tape, ensuring that funds move quickly 
(Farrington and Lobo 1997).  As of July 2000, the IGWDP has developed 123 villages 
covering about 130,000 ha, with the involvement of 74 NGOs (WOTR 2000).  Plans are 
being considered to spread this program to other states. 
Investment in physical capital under the IGWDP begins only after evidence of 
social organization suggests that people will work together to maintain the investments 
on both private and community land.  As with the AGY, there is as strong an emphasis on 
developing the village’s social capital as its natural and physical capital, and the villagers 
must submit to similarly strict social conditions. 
The work begins with 12 to 18 months of social organization work.  This is 
almost 12 to 18 months longer than the social organization phase of a typical government 
watershed program, but it is shorter than that of many NGOs, which conduct work on 
several other areas of village development before venturing into watershed development.  
One important early project activity under the IGWDP is to plant trees and grasses in the 
catchment area.  This is done prior to building water harvesting structures in order to 
force the inhabitants of the village to show that they can enforce social fencing to protect 
natural vegetation.  Only after people demonstrate such social discipline does the project 
invest larger amounts of funds in new watershed structures. 
The NGO helps organize and develop a Village Watershed Committee (VWC), 
which is essentially a village-based NGO.  The idea is that the VWC will eventually 







INVESTMENT COSTS PER HECTARE UNDER EACH PROJECT 
Information about the cost per hectare under different projects is helpful in 
assessing their cost effectiveness.  It also helps in interpreting the findings of quantitative 
analysis presented later in this paper; it should not be surprising if one project that spends 
twice as much as another also has more measurable impact. 
Unfortunately, measuring project costs is difficult.  Some projects, including the 
NWDPRA and the World Bank, have expenditure guidelines that can be taken as a broad 
indication of the level of investment per hectare.  Others require calculating estimates 
based on the total expenditure and the total area covered, but records are difficult to 
obtain.  For example, officials of the Jal Sandharan project say that their budgets are 
constructed on the basis of structures to be built and vegetation to be planted, not the area 
of the watershed.  Accordingly, calculations of cost per hectare are only approximate. 
NGOs tend to keep poor records about costs per ha, and calculating them is very 
difficult because NGOs tend to undertake a variety of activities in addition to watershed 
development.  So even when costs can be calculated, it is not always clear what to 
attribute them to.  One certainty is that NGOs have much higher administrative costs than 
government projects, since they devote much more time to social organization for which 
expenditures are not directly tied to treated area. 
In Maharashtra, since nearly all projects operate in ex-COWDEP villages, 
calculating costs requires taking the sum of expenditures under both the old and new 
programs.  Records from the old projects are poor, so the cost figures are only approximate. 
Rough estimates of project costs per hectare by project category are presented in 
Table 2.  For the NWDPRA and World Bank Pilot Project the upper range is the cost 
listed in the project guidelines, while for the Jal Sandharan and COWDEP it is based on 
the total number of structures built divided by the area covered.  AGY and IGWDP costs 
are calculated similarly but there are higher staff costs.  The NGO figures are based on 







Table 2: Estimated cost per ha of watershed development under different programs 
Project category  Approximate cost per ha in 1998 Rs.  
  excluding COWDEP  Including COWDEP 
NWDPRA  2500-3500  4000-6000 
Jal Sandharan  2500-4000  4000-6500 
NGOs  4000-6000  5500-8500 
AGY/IGWDP  3500-5500  5000-8000 
World Bank  5500-6500  5500-6500 
 
 
3.   DATA 
 
Evaluating watershed projects requires baseline and monitoring data for 
comparison of pre- and post-project conditions, but unfortunately no such information 
was available for this study.  As a result, the quantitative analysis is based on some 
secondary data available for both the pre-project period (1987
8) and the present (1997), 
primary data of current conditions based on interviews and visual assessments, and 
primary data of past conditions based on recall by local inhabitants.  Inevitably there are 
weaknesses in the data that limit the study’s analytical power. 
A major component of the research was the development and collection of data on 
various indicators of performance in natural resource conservation, agricultural 
productivity, and equitable distribution of project benefits.  These data were collected 
through direct observation, group discussions, and published records.  Quantitative data 
were also collected on the background characteristics of the projects, villages, households 
and plots covered under the study.  Some of the village-level information came from 
public sources, but most of it was collected from group and individual interviews in each 
village.  In addition, qualitative data were collected regarding the natural resources 
people use to earn their livelihoods, the social institutions that govern access to those 
resources, and any changes in access to them resulting either from changes in their 
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quantity or changes in social institutions.  This information was collected in open-ended 
discussions with members of specific interest groups in each village, such as farmers with 
irrigated land, farmers with rainfed land, landless people, herders, and women. 
The village, rather than the watershed, was selected for analysis of community 
level indicators of natural resource management and economic performance.  This is 
because most projects in the sample worked at the village- or sub-village level, people are 
organized around villages, and secondary data are recorded at the level of the village.  In 
some cases, particularly in Andhra Pradesh, villages are disaggregated into hamlets, in 
which case primary data were collected at the hamlet level. 
 
PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
There is no single indicator of successful watershed development, so the most 
feasible approach is to compare the performance of a variety of indicators.  The various 
performance indicators also reflect the diversity of project objectives.  These include, 
among other things, raising rainfed agricultural productivity, recharging groundwater for 
drinking and irrigation, raising productivity of nonarable lands, reducing soil erosion, 
skewing benefits toward poorer members of society, creating employment (directly and 
indirectly), promoting collective action, and building or strengthening social institutions.  
All the projects surveyed shared most of these objectives but, as described in Section 2, 
they differed in their relative emphasis. 
As mentioned above, the indicators vary in their level of rigor and reliability, 
which is inevitable given the lack of baseline or monitoring data in the study villages.  
Table 3 presents an overview of performance criteria, ideal indicators, and the indicators 







Table 3: Performance indicators used to compare project performance 
Note: 
a All ideal indicators would be collected both before and after the project. 
 
Performance criteria  Ideal indicators
a
  Proxy indicators used in this study 
Soil erosion  ￿ measurement of erosion and 
associated yield loss 
 
￿ visual assessment of rill and gully erosion (current 
only) 
Measures taken to 
arrest erosion 
￿ inventory, adoption and 
effectiveness of soil and water 
conservation (SWC) practices 
￿ visual assessment of SWC investments and apparent 
effectiveness (current only) 
￿ adoption of conservation-oriented agronomic 
practices  
￿ expenditure on SWC investments 
Groundwater 
recharge 
￿ measurement of groundwater 
levels, controlling for aquifer 
characterisitcs, climate 
variation and pumping volume 
￿ approximate change in number of wells 
￿ approximate number of wells recharged or defunct 
￿ change in irrigated area 
￿ change in number of seasons irrigated for a sample of 
plots 




￿ time series, intrayear and 
interyear variations in soil 
moisture, controlling for 
climate variation 
 
￿ change in cropping patterns 
￿ change in cropping intensity on rainfed plots 
￿ relative change in yields (higher, same or lower) 
Agricultural profits  ￿ net returns at the plot level  ￿ net returns at the plot level, current year only 
Productivity of 
nonarable lands 
￿ change in production from 
revenue and forest lands (actual 
quantities) 
 
￿ relative change in production from revenue and forest 
lands (more, same or less than pre-project) 
￿ extent of erosion and SWC on nonarable lands 
Household welfare  ￿ change in household income 
and wealth 
￿ nutritional status 
￿ perceived effects of the project on the household 
￿ perceived change in living standard (better, same, 
worse) 
￿ change in housing quality 
￿ change in percentage of families migrating 
￿ perceived changes in real wage and availability of 







Table 4: Performance domains and the units of analysis at which they operate 
Type of performance  Level of measurement 
  Village  Plot  Household 
Social organization  • institutions to protect 
common lands 
•  use of voluntary 
community labor 





•  irrigated area and 
drinking water supply 
•  soil erosion and 
conservation 
•  products from 
common lands 
•  habitat for wild 
animals and migratory 
birds 
• irrigated area 











Agricultural productivity  •  soil erosion and 
conservation 
•  irrigation 
•  cropping 
intensity 
•  adoption of 
new varieties 
•  crop yield 
•  returns to 
cultivation 
 
Equity and poverty 
alleviation 
    •  assets (wealth) 
•  access to 
employment 
•  standard of living 




Determinants of Project Performance 
Village level: Data collected at the village level are based on a survey covering 
background information such as access to markets, land use patterns, natural resource 
management practices, and description of social institutions operating in the village.  
Most background information is available for both 1987 and 1997.  A village-level 
survey was conducted to obtain most of this information, and additional background 
variables were obtained from the 1991 census.  Performance indicators at the village level 






resource conditions from village level transects covering a cross-section of broadly 
representative land types and uses. 
Plot level: A plot-level survey was conducted to collect data on agricultural 
productivity and adoption of improved technologies and practices.  This provides 
information about changes resulting from the watershed projects and other determining 
factors.  The sample includes both irrigated and rainfed plots, and both plots covered and 
not covered by watershed projects.  Village-level information related to each plot is 
available from the village survey.  Some household-level information for each plot’s 
operator was also collected as a part of the plot survey. 
Household level: A household-level survey supplied detailed information about 
household characteristics and changes in household welfare.  This provides indications of 
how watershed projects and changes in a variety of village- and household-level conditions 
have affected household welfare.  This survey recorded concrete changes in living standards, 
such as ownership of durable goods and quality of housing, as well as respondents’ 
subjective assessments of changes in their well-being.  The household survey was conducted 
using a different set of respondents from the plot survey, but in the same villages. 
Interest group level: A fourth set of interviews focused on different interest 
groups within the village, such as farmers with irrigation, farmers without irrigation, 
landless people, and women.  The information provided by these interviews offers a 
qualitative assessment of project performance from the viewpoint of the intended 
beneficiaries, and it provides further insights about how project benefits and costs are 
distributed across different groups of people within the village. 
 
Sampling 
Sampling villages for data collection was a major undertaking in itself.  The 
situation in Pune and Ahmednagar districts of western Maharashtra provides a good 
example of the difficulties.  Despite widespread publicity about the success of the 
watershed approach to agricultural development, hard data were quite limited.  A few 
widely known success stories were easy to locate, but others were not.  This was the case 






districts, but the famous success stories accounted for no more than a handful.  Second, a 
complete list of villages where projects have operated did not exist.  The most active 
watershed agency in the area, the Maharashtra Department of Soil and Water 
Conservation, kept good records of the villages where work was currently underway, but 
lists of villages where work had been completed were archived and could be accessed 
only with difficulty.  Some government programs, like the NWDPRA, maintained lists of 
project locations only at the taluka level.  NGOs maintained their own lists, which could 
be obtained by visiting the head office.  As a result, simply identifying project villages 
required a great deal of legwork.  The resulting list of project villages was then checked 
against the complete list of all villages from the national census so that nonproject 
villages could be selected as a control against which to compare project performance.  All 
the sampled villages were visited to confirm their project status. 
The Maharashtra study villages were all located in Pune and Ahmednagar districts 
in the western part of the state, where there was a relatively high concentration of 
watershed project sites.  The eastern side of this study area is drought-prone, while the 
area closer to the Western Ghat mountain range has higher rainfall.  In Andhra Pradesh 
the projects were less concentrated, so the sample villages covered 4 districts: Anantapur 
in the far south of the state and Medak, Mahbubnagar and Ranga Reddy, all of which are 
in the north, near Hyderabad. 
Based on available knowledge about project status of villages, the sample was 
selected at random, stratified by the project categories listed above and, in Maharashtra, 
by geographic location.  With five project categories and two geographical zones, there 
are ten strata in Maharashtra.  A small amount of resampling was done to replace villages 
incorrectly classified as “control” after visits to the villages revealed that watershed 
projects had operated there in the 1980s.  In Andhra Pradesh, where only sixteen villages 
were sampled, geographic stratification was omitted to ensure that each stratum has at 
least two observations.  Thus Andhra Pradesh has only five strata. 
As shown in Table 5, data were collected in 70 villages in Maharashtra and 16 
villages in Andhra Pradesh.  A full set of quantitative and qualitative data at the village, 






Maharashtra villages and all 16 Andhra Pradesh villages, for a total of 29.  In the 
remaining 57 Maharashtra villages only village level data were collected.  The village-
level analysis is confined to the 70 Maharashtra villages, while the plot-level analysis 
covers the 29 villages from both states where more detailed data were collected.  The 
qualitative data cover primarily these same 29 villages. 
 
 
Table 5: Location of the study villages 
Type of analysis  Maharashtra  Andhra Pradesh  Total 
Total  70  16  86 
Village-level (quantitative)  57  0  57 
Village, plot, household (quantitative) 
and interest group (qualitative) 
13  16  29 
 
 
Teams of five to seven village investigators spent four days and nights in each of 
the 29 villages where they collected the full set of quantitative and qualitative data.  In 
the remaining 57 villages in Maharashtra where only village-level data were collected, 
teams of three to four investigators spent two to three days. 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLED VILLAGES AND PLOTS 
Village Characteristics 
Village-level analysis is presented for Maharashtra.  Conditions in the two states 
are sufficiently different to make it useful to analyze them separately, and the 
Maharashtra sample of 70 villages facilitates the analysis. 
Villages are characterized by a variety of factors that might affect performance in 
agricultural productivity, natural resource management and living standards.  Table 6 








Table 6: Definitions of variables for analysis at the village level
a 
Description of variable  Years for which data 
are available 
Source of data 
Indicators of performance     
 Change in percent area irrigated between 1987 and 1997     
 Overall rill erosion status by land use type  1997  visual observations from the transect survey 
 Soil conservation investment status by land use type  1997  visual observations from the transect survey 
 Overall condition of drainage line  1997  visual observations from the drainage line transect 
 Extent and conditions of bunds lining the drainage line  1997  visual observations from the drainage line transect 
 Extent of breaches in the sides of the drainage line  1997  visual observations from the drainage line transect 
 Condition of junctions between drainage lines in the main drainage line  1987 to 1997  visual observations from the drainage line transect 
 Change in % of families migrating for at least one month  1987 to 1997  primary data 
 Change in availability of fodder and fuel from the common revenue land 
(Rs/ha) 
1987 to 1997  primary data 
Determinants of performance of the project and/or selection of a village for inclusion in a project  
 Location: state, district,     
 Altitude range of the village from highest to lowest point (meters)    government statistics 
 Position in the macrowatershed (lower, middle or upper reaches)     government statistics 
 % of village area under Forest Department  1987 to 1997  government statistics 
 Distance to taluka headquarters (km)  1987 to 1997  primary data 
 Distance to nearest bus stop (km)  1987 to 1997  primary data 
 Visits by an extension agent (number per year)  1987 to 1997  primary data 
 Number of communities in the village  1997  primary data 
 Percentage of villagers who are low caste  1990  national census 
 Percentage of villagers in different occupations  1990  national census 
 Distance to bank (km)  1987 and 1997  primary  
 Restrictions against grazing on common revenue land (yes/no)  1987 and 1997  primary  
 Illicit grazing is punished (yes/no)  1987 and 1997  primary 
 Shramdan (voluntary communal labor) is practiced in the village (yes/no)  1987 and 1997  primary 
 History of development projects that have operated in the village  1987 and 1997  primary 
 Strong leader who promotes social and economic development (yes/no)  1997  primary 






Table 6 continued 
Description of variable  Years for which data 
are available 
Source of data 
 Percent of the village actually covered by the project    agency records 
 Money spent by the project (Rs/ha)    agency records 
 Year project began and ended    agency records 
 Population density (inhabitants per square km),  1990  national census 
 Distance to nearest industrial unit (km)  1987 and 1997  primary 
 Distance to regulated market (km)  1987 and 1997  primary 
 Informal credit groups (yes/no)  1987 and 1997  primary 
 Number of functional water-harvesting structures  1997  primary 
 Social restrictions on water use for irrigation (yes/no)  1987 and 1997  primary 
 Nominal daily wage (Rs)  1987 and 1997  primary 
 Average annual rainfall at the nearest taluka headquarters (mm)    government records
 











Table 7 shows the number of sampled villages in each project category and also 
the total number of villages in the study area.  The relatively small number of sampled 
villages under the NWDPRA, NGO and AGY/IGWDP categories reflects the fact that 
these projects were not very widespread at the time of the study; the sample includes 
nearly the entire population for the projects.
9  The Jal Sandharan and nonproject villages 
in the sample, on the other hand, represent only a small fraction of their total populations. 
 
 
Table 7: Number of villages in the Maharashtra village-level survey, by project 
category 
Project category  Number of 
villages 
sampled 
Total population of 
villages in the study 
area 
NWDPRA  10  11 
Jal Sandharan/DPAP  17  201 
NGO  12  13 
Government/Non-government collaboration  14  27 
No project  17  361 
Total  70  613 
 
 
Project Characteristics: As discussed in Section 2, projects vary in various 
characteristics such as the percentage of village area that they cover, the number of years 
they operate, the amount of funds they spend, and the training of their staff.  Table 8 
presents the approximate mean values of such information for the sampled villages in 
Maharashtra.  The figures in the table show that the percentage of each village covered 
and total expenditure per hectare in each village
10 are slightly less under the NWDPRA 
than other projects, but these differences are not significant.  As discussed in Section 2, 
an important difference is the fact that the NWPDRA projects cover multiple villages 
while the other projects work in only one village at a time. 
                                                 
9 Subsequent expansion of the Indo-German project and the Drought Prone Area 
Project raised the number of villages in these categories.  Under its new guidelines, the 
DPAP works mainly through NGOs, so the number of NGO-led projects in the study area 
is slated to rise quickly. 
10 Total expenditure per hectare is calculated as the cost per hectare treated 





Villages are also differentiated by the amount of time in which they have 
undergone watershed work.  This is so for both the current or most recent watershed project 
and earlier work (if any) in the 1980s done by the Maharashtra Department of Soil and 
Water Conservation under COWDEP.  Table 8 shows that, by either measure, the average 
duration of projects is not significantly different across watershed project categories.  With 
the exception of the nonproject villages, all but two villages in the sample also had work 
done under COWDEP in the 1980s.  The amount of work actually performed by COWDEP 
varied by village, but the figures in Table 8 are still striking: in one form or another, 
watershed development has taken place in these villages for a long time. 
Finally, perhaps the most noticeable point in Table 8 is the difference across 
projects in the percentage of staff members trained in social organization skills.  In the 
two government programs (NWDPRA and Jal Sandharan) no staff members had any 
training in social organization, while in those with an NGO component nearly half of 
them did.  This reflects the differences in relative orientation toward social organization 






Table 8: Project operations in villages under each project category, Maharashtra
a 
  NWDPRA  DPAP/Jal 
Sandharan 
NGO  NGO/Govt 
collaboration 
No project 
Mean area of the village (ha)  2102  1422  1209  1144  905 
Number of villages in which 
COWDEP previously worked (out of 
total sample) 
9/10  16/17  11/12  14/14  0/17 
Mean % area covered by the old 
project (COWDEP) 
38  49  43  46  -- 
Mean % area covered by new projects  36  39  42  38  -- 
Mean % area covered by both old and 
new projects 
74  88  85  84  -- 
Mean % of staff members with 
training in social organization
b 
0  0  42  45  -- 
Mean number of years since the most 
recent project ended 
0  0  0.25  0  -- 
Mean number of years of work under 
COWDEP 
7.2  8.4  7  8.7  -- 
Mean number of years under the new 
project 
5.9  4.9  6  5.1  -- 
Mean number of years under both 
projects 
13.1  13.3  13  13.8  -- 
Mean cost/ha actually treated under 
new project (Rs) 
4500  4783  4989  4963  -- 
Mean expenditure/ha for entire village 
under COWDEP  (Rs) 
1880  2355  2148  2310  -- 
Mean expenditure/ha for entire village 
under new project (Rs) 
1622  2006  2207  1874  -- 
Mean expenditure/ha for entire village 
under both projects (Rs) 
3501  4361  4355  4185  -- 
Notes: 
a Most figures are approximate, based on calculations from official records. 
b Analysis of variance (ANOVA) test shows that group means differ significantly across 
project category (excluding nonproject) only for the percentage of staff members with 
training in social skills (F=45, 3 df, p<.001).  No other variables listed in this table show 




Approximately 12 plots were sampled in each of 13 villages in Maharashtra and 
16 in Andhra Pradesh.  The villages were stratified by watershed project category; the 
resulting sample of villages selected is shown in Table 9.  Within each village, plots and 
households were selected at random, stratified by land capability classification and 





representative areas of the village, until four plots were selected in each of three land 




Table 9: Number of villages covered in the plot survey, by state and project category 
Project category  Number of projects 
  Maharashtra  Andhra Pradesh 
World Bank/ICAR  0  4 
NWDPRA   2  3 
Jal Sandharan/DPAP  2  3 
NGO  3  3 
AGY/IGWDP  3  0 
No project  3  3 
Total  13  16 
 
 
As shown in Table 10, about 30 percent of the plots are irrigated, with the 
proportion of irrigated land higher on better quality land.  (About 21 percent of plots were 
irrigated at the start of the study period in 1987.)  62 percent of class II lands are 
irrigated, while the corresponding figures for class III and class IV lands are 37 percent 
and 7 percent, respectively.  This distribution arises for two reasons.  First, given the 
choice farmers will irrigate their better lands first, since water will give higher returns 
when applied to better soil.  Second, land class is somewhat endogenous with respect to 
irrigation, since irrigated plots tend to be leveled and receive higher organic matter 
inputs.  As a result, it is possible for a given plot to change to a higher land classification 
after it becomes irrigated. 
 
                                                 
11 In some villages, the sampling approach was altered somewhat because there 
were not enough plots with the desired irrigation status or land capability classification.  
For example, in some villages land quality could only be divided into two categories, and 





Table 10: Number of plots in the plot survey, by irrigation and land capability 
classification 
Irrigation status  Land capability classification  Totals 
  II  III  IV   
Rainfed  22  99  125  246 
Irrigated  37  59  9  105 
Total  59  158  134  351 
 
 
Sampled plots were not stratified by the farmer’s total land holding size, but as 
shown in Table 11 the sample is distributed fairly evenly across respondents of different 
land holding size.  It is important to note that the sampling approach oversampled large 
plots relative to small ones, because the transect line was more likely to cross a large plot 
than a small one.  However, plots are not large overall; the mean size is 0.72 ha and the 
median is 0.42 ha. 
 
 
Table 11: Sample for the plot survey, categorized by land holding size 
Category  Hectares operated  Number 
Small  0-2  118 
Medium  2-4  114 
Large  >4  119 
Total    351 
 
 
The sampling approach led to a reasonably even distribution of plots across 
categories when classified by soil, irrigation and land size holding.  Other factors were 
not controlled, however; for example, village and household characteristics that may 
affect productivity and natural resource conditions at the plot level may vary across 
project category.  Data were collected to incorporate these factors in the plot-level 
analysis.  Table 12 presents the various characteristics to be examined in the plot-level 





Table 12: Plot, household, village and project characteristics that potentially 
determine performance at the plot level
a 
Description of variable  Years data are 
available 
Source of data 
Biophysical and management characteristics of the plot     
 Plot area (hectares)  1987 and 1997  primary 
 Average annual rainfall measured at the nearest taluka headquarters 
(mm) 
  secondary data 
 Land capability classification:  sample includes plots of class II, III, and IV  investigator’s 
visual assessment 
 Irrigation status in 1987 and 1997: 1 if it is irrigated at least one season, 0 if it is rainfed  primary 
 Slope: 1 if slope is 0-2%, 2 if slope is 2-4%, 3 if slope is 4-8%   1997  primary 
Characteristics of the farm household     
 Total hectares of land owned by the household  1987 and 1997  primary 
 Total number of adult workers in the household (men, women and 
long term hired workers) 
1997  primary 
 Highest number years schooling of any male household member  1987 and 1997   primary 
 Highest number years schooling of any female household member  1987 and 1997  primary 
 % income from off-farm sources  1997  primary 
 Change in percentage of off-farm income between 1987 and 1997    primary 
 Tenure status: 1 if the farmer owns the plot, 0 if the operator is a tenant 
or sharecropper 
1997  primary  
 Land title status: 1 if the farmer has a transferable title, 0 if not     primary 
 Plot rank (relative to farmer’s other plots): 1 if it is the farmer’s only 
plot or a better than the average quality plot in his holding, 2 if it is an 
average quality plot, 3 if it is below average. 
1997  primary 
 Farmer interacted with project staff: 1 if the farmer has interacted with 
the project staff, 0 if not. 
anytime between 
1987 and 1997 
primary 
 Project staff made technical recommendations to farmer: 1 if the 
project staff made technical suggestions, 0 if not. 
anytime between 
1987 and 1997 
primary 
 Farmer adopted technologies or practices recommended by project 
staff: 1 if the farmer adopted the agency’s suggestion, 0 if not. 
anytime between 
1987 and 1997 
primary 
Village level     
 Village, taluka, district, state     
 Altitude range between highest and lowest point in the village (meters)  secondary 
 Position in macrowatershed (lower, middle or upper reaches)    secondary 
 Distance to taluka headquarters (km)    primary   
 Distance to district headquarters (km)     
 Distance to a large city (Pune in Maharashtra, Hyderabad or Bangalore in Andhra Pradesh), 
km 
secondary 
 Type of road connecting the village (highway, paved road, good 
unpaved road, bad unpaved road, bullock cart path) 
1987 and 1997  primary 
 Distance in km to nearest bus stop (km)   1987 and 1997  primary data 
 Number of visits to the village by an extension agent per month  1987 and 1997  primary 






Table 12 continued 
Description of variable  Years data are 
available 
Source of data 
 Strong leader in the village promotes social and economic 
development (1 if yes, 0 if no) 
1997 only  primary 
 Population density (inhabitants per square km.)  1990  1991 census 
 Distance to nearest industrial unit (km)   1987 and 1997  primary 
 Distance to nearest regulated market (km)  1987 and 1997  primary 
 Nominal daily wage (Rs)  1987 and 1997   primary 
 Percentage of houses in the village with an electrical connection  1987 and 1997   primary 
Project level     
 Type of watershed project operating in the village, if any    project records 
 Number of years the current or most recent watershed project 
operated in the village 
  project records  
 Combined number of years under the most recent watershed project 
and another previous project  
  project records  
 Approximate percentage of the village’s area covered under the 
project 
  project records  
Notes: 
a Primary data for 1987 are based on respondents’ recall in 1997.   
 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF HOUSEHOLD AND INTEREST GROUP RESPONDENTS 
In addition to demographic and socioeconomic data collected for the household 
operating each sampled plot, an additional detailed household survey was conducted to 
learn about the welfare impacts of watershed projects and other factors potentially 
influencing development.  347 respondents were sampled randomly, stratified by land 
holding size.  These respondents differed from those in the plot survey in that about 20% 
of them were entirely landless; the remaining respondents also had smaller holdings on 
average than those in the plot survey.  This report does not draw much on the household 
survey, so it is not described in detail here. 
Group interviews to collect qualitative data were collected in the same 29 villages 
as the plot data.  The respondents for these interviews included the village’s elected 
leader, or sarpanch, representatives of the watershed agency, and specific interest groups 
in the village such as farmers with irrigated land, farmers without irrigation, landless 
people (often herders), people from low castes, etc.  Men and women were interviewed in 
separate groups.  Facilitators of these discussions had a list of unstructured questions to 





4.   METHODS 
 
This section discusses the approach taken to identify the contribution of 
watershed projects to agricultural productivity, natural resource management and poverty 
alleviation, taking into account the contributions of other factors such as infrastructure 
development, agroclimatic conditions and village-level social capital.  The analysis is 
structured around the basic program evaluation question: what would have been the state 
of agricultural productivity, natural resource management and poverty in the absence of 
the project interventions?  Answering this question is complicated, because one never 
observes the same villages (or households or plots) both participating and not 
participating in the program at the same time.  As a result, care is needed to identify other 
factors that may have contributed to observed outcomes.  These include contemporaneous 
events, such as changes in infrastructure and market access, and systematic biases in 
where the projects choose to operate or which villages (or people) choose to participate.  
Since projects are not placed randomly, differences in project outcomes may depend on 
pre-existing village characteristics in addition to project activities. 
Historically, the evaluation profession has been characterized by a split between 
quantitative and qualitative researchers.  Recent years, however, have seen a growing 
appreciation of the benefits of combining the approaches of both (Greene and Caracelli 
1997; Patton 1997).  Quantitative evaluation uses statistical analysis to disentangle 
project effects from intervening factors, relying mainly on theory to explain how the 
project activities lead to impact.  It follows the logical positivist belief that a single, 
objective truth exists independently of the observer.  Qualitative evaluation, on the other 
hand, tends to make fewer assumptions about how a project affects individual behavior.  
It focuses on the mechanisms of change while also yielding qualitative measures of 
impact.  Combining the two types of information can yield a particularly thorough 
understanding of project impact. 
This study uses mainly quantitative analysis, but it also draws on qualitative 
information to better understand the relevant research questions, identify projects’ 





stage for a better-informed quantitative investigation, with greater confidence that 
statistical analysis addresses the most important questions and incorporates the most 
relevant variables.  Subsequent qualitative investigation then helps interpret the findings 
of the statistical analysis and rule out competing explanations for observed differences 
across projects.  This is particularly important given limitations in the data. 
 
ASSESSING ENDOGENEITY IN PROGRAM PLACEMENT 
The critical problem in quantitative evaluation is endogeneity, which arises if 
some factors affect the project placement and the outcome simultaneously.  This makes it 
difficult to distinguish the effect of the project from the underlying factors that 
determined where the project operated.  The only way to solve this problem completely 
would be to observe the same individual at the same point in time, both with and without 
the project.  Of course this is not possible, so the evaluator must try to set up one group of 
observations affected by the project treatment, and a control group not affected by the 
project but identical in every other way.  This follows the standard experimental design 
of the natural scientist.  In practice, in many social science settings it may be possible to 
identify similar but not identical treatment and control groups, so the social scientist’s 
experimental design can never be perfect (Manski 1995).  This is discussed below with 
respect to watershed projects. 
Evaluators follow three main approaches to establishing control and treatment 
groups: randomization, or pure experimental design; quasi-experimental design, and non-
experimental design (Ezemenari et al. 1999).  Randomization refers to randomly placing 
individuals into two groups—one that receives the project treatment and one that does 
not.  This solves the endogeneity problem by ensuring that the two groups are statistically 
equivalent, so that any difference in average outcomes after the project can be attributed 
to the project.  In the present context, five separate randomly placed groups would be 
needed: four for the different watershed projects and one control.  Obviously the 
randomization must take place before the projects begin.  In the case of Indian 
watersheds, the different projects operated independently and little or no advance thought 





Quasi-experimental design involves matching program participants with a 
comparable group of individuals who did not participate in the program.  This simulates 
randomization but need not take place prior to the intervention.  For example, Pitt and 
Khandker (1996) used such an approach to estimate the effects of microcredit programs 
in Bangladesh.  They matched program and nonprogram villages and then devised an 
elaborate set of matched groups in both sets of villages based on eligibility requirements 
for participating in the programs.  In another example, Jalan and Ravallion (1998) took 
advantage of a large existing data set to estimate the probability that households 
participated in a public works program in Argentina.  They then constructed treatment 
and control groups by matching participating and nonparticipating households that had 
the same predicted probability of participation (Ezemenari et al. 1999). 
In the present study villages in each project category were matched 
geographically, but there was insufficient data to match them in a more rigorous manner.  
A nonexperimental design was used instead. 
Several nonexperimental approaches are possible.  One way comes from the Pitt 
et al. (1993) study of Indonesian poverty programs referred to in Section 1.  Because 
those programs were intentionally located in the poorest areas, purely cross-sectional 
analysis would have suggested mistakenly that the programs actually increased poverty.  
More formally, the simple approach that yielded the incorrect finding was as follows:   
 
 Y = a + bW  + cX + e  (1) 
 
where the outcome (Y) is a function of the watershed project treatment effect (W) and 
other determining factors (X), a is the intercept and e is the error term.  This approach is 
valid if the other factors (X) include all possible determinants of treatment effect and if 
program placement is independent of treatment effect.  Since this is unlikely to be the 
case, the estimated effect of the treatment is likely to be biased.  In the case analyzed by 
Pitt et al. (1993), the project coefficient b in equation 1 had a negative coefficient; i.e., 
the analysis suggested incorrectly that the project contributed to poverty.   
Pitt et al. approached this problem by estimating the change between pre-project 





determining factors, such as demographic conditions and access to services and markets. In 
this model, the nonproject determining factors are grouped into socioeconomic variables 
(X) that vary both spatially and temporally, and environmental variables (E) that vary 
across villages but are fixed over time.  The relationship can be expressed as follows
12: 
 
 DY = aDW + bDX + cE +De  (2) 
 
This approach isolates the changes associated with the project, eliminating the 
bias associated with the influence of pre-existing conditions on both the program 
placement and the outcome.  However, it presumes availability of panel data (containing 
conditions both before and after the program), and it presumes that sufficient change 
occurred in the socioeconomic variables X to estimate them.  In the present study, over 
the ten-year study period many socioeconomic variables in question, such as 
infrastructure conditions and the distance to markets and services, did not change in most 
villages.  As a result, many variables contained mainly values of zero, with insufficient 
variation within the sample to perform econometric analysis.  Wherever possible, 
variables are expressed in terms of the change during the project period, but for most 
explanatory variables the value at the start of the project period is used. 
Another way to control for endogeneity of program placement in estimating 
program effects is through instrumental variables.  A variety of two-stage models for 
estimating treatment effects or sample selection bias provide models for this approach 
(Maddala 1993; Greene 1990).  One equation yields the predicted probability that any 
given case is selected (or self-selects) for treatment under a given program.  Then, in a 
two-stage model, another regression estimates the outcome in question, replacing the 
endogenous treatment variable W with its predicted value ￿, eliminating the 
endogeneity.  In this case the model is as follows: 
 
 W = a + bX + cZ + e  (3) 
                                                 
12 In this specification W may be considered as program expenditure in a given 
location, so DW is the change in program expenditure between two points of time.  W 
could also be specified as project dummy variables, in which case W would replace DW 






 Y = f + g ￿  + hX + e  (4) 
 
where X is a set of variables correlated to both the outcome Y and the placement of 
project treatment W, and Z is a set of variables that affect W but not Y. 
 
In the present context, equations (3) and (4) can be written more specifically as: 
 
 W = a + bV + cZ + e  (5) 
 
 Y = f + g ￿  + hV + iH + jP + e  (6) 
 
where: W is a categorical variable indicating one of five watershed project categories; ￿  is 
the predicted probability that the project falls in each watershed project category; Y represents 
outcomes defined in terms of the performance indicators introduced in section 3; V is a set of 
village-level explanatory variables; H is a set of household-level variables; and P is a set of 
plot-level explanatory variables.  Both H and P are omitted from village-level analysis. 
Equation 5 is a multinomial logit model because W is categorical.  Equation 6 
takes different forms depending on the nature of the performance indicator in question; 
these variables may be continuous, binary or ordinal. In most of the models equation 6 is 
an ordinal logit model, in some it is a binary probit, and in a few it is a tobit or an 
ordinary least squares regression.  In all of these cases, the models are adjusted for the 
use of complex survey data (Stata 1999). 
A remaining shortcoming of the model is that, for technical reasons, the standard 
errors could not be corrected for the fact that predicted values were used in the 
regressions.  The author is not aware of formulas to correct the standard errors for the 
complex two-stage regressions used in the analysis.  Bootstrapping was not justifiable 
due to the small number of observations per stratum.  Pender and Scherr (1998) faced this 
same problem; they examined the robustness of their findings by comparing their 
regression results using actual vs. predicted values.  This study follows the same 







Qualitative investigation took the form of detailed, open-ended discussions, 
mostly at the group-level with people from different interest groups.  The findings from 
this work helped identify some of the questions posed in the quantitative analysis, and it 
also helped interpret the findings.  This study was primarily quantitative, so the 
qualitative data played mainly a supporting role.  In a few cases data limitations 
prevented the quantitative analysis from yielding any useful information, so the 
qualitative analysis became the sole source of insight from the fieldwork.  However, time 
constraints limited the scope of the qualitative investigation to less than would be ideal.  
In particular, it would have been desirable to engage in a more thorough qualitative 
investigation after having analyzed the quantitative data.  
Qualitative data were recorded in written notes and yielded a variety of forms of 
data.  Some findings from these interviews could be translated into numeric data, while 
others helped to explain the specific problems that people faced or the ways that projects 
affected them.  Findings from these interviews are presented in this report alongside those 
from quantitative analysis as a means of providing additional insight. 
 
5.   HOW PROJECTS CHOOSE WHERE TO OPERATE 
 
As explained in Section 4, how a project selects villages in which to work can 
have a major impact on what it can achieve since, as introduced above, a variety of 
conditioning factors can have a strong influence on people’s incentives to invest in land 
improvement.  This section reviews each project’s published site selection criteria and 
then examines the data to characterize villages under each project. 
 
PROJECT SITE-SELECTION GUIDELINES 
DPAP: The pre-1995 DPAP focused on small microwatersheds located within 
predominantly rainfed villages with relatively little irrigated area.  The irrigation 





1125 mm average annual rainfall the DPAP could operate if irrigated area was less than 
10%, whereas if rainfall was less than 750 mm irrigated area could be up to 20%. 
Jal Sandharan: The Jal Sandharan project selected villages according to four 
conditions.
13  First, they would be selected if COWDEP had operated there and 
completed more than 50% of the watershed development work.  This would enable 
treatment of the entire watershed to be completed through the Jal Sandharan program 
within five years.  Second, they should have a scarcity of drinking water.  Third, they 
should be located in a taluka (a subdistrict administrative unit containing up to 200 
villages) with scarce groundwater (as designated by the state Groundwater Survey and 
Development Agency).  And fourth, they must lie outside of the outside of the command 
of a canal irrigation project.   
World Bank Pilot Project: Unlike the other projects in the study that work in one 
or two villages at a time, the Pilot Project worked in very large, contiguous areas of about 
25,000 ha with at least 750 mm average annual rainfall and little irrigation.  Villages in 
the core watershed area were treated in their entirety, whereas those in the periphery 
typically lie partly in the watershed and partly outside.  In that case only the part of the 
village lying inside the watershed was treated. 
NWDPRA: The NWDPRA operates in areas with less than 30% irrigation, with 
no criteria concerning average annual rainfall.  Preferably sites should be located in the 
upper reaches of the local macrowatershed.  Project sites should be close to the taluka or 
block headquarters in order to facilitate supervision by officials based at headquarters, 
and close to markets so that “farmers from nearby areas can assemble and see the process 
and feel the impact of the project interventions (GOI 1991a).”  Project sites should be 
located on the main road, easily accessible to government officials and other visitors.  To 
quote the guidelines, “Just a pause on the road would give an opportunity to have a bird’s 
eye view of the project area.  This will ensure visual impact on intentional and 
unintentional visitors (GOI 1991a).” 
NGOs: NGOs all have their own guidelines, but virtually all of them stress 
working in poverty-stricken areas, often inhabited by tribal groups.  MYRADA’s 
                                                 





guidelines are instructive.  It operates in remote, unfavorable areas, usually in the border 
areas of a state, far from the state capital, that are relatively neglected by state-level 
development programs.  They have the worst land, the worst infrastructure, and the least 
well-off inhabitants.  The typical MYRADA village has practically opposite 
characteristics of those in NWDPRA project sites described above. 
AGY: Any village is eligible for participation in the AGY if it is located in a 
drought-prone area of Maharashtra, with no more than 30% cultivated area under irrigation.  
The villagers must meet in the Gram Sabha (assembly of all adults in the village) to pledge 
to accept and abide by the five social principles listed above.  70 percent of the Gram Sabha 
must agree to participate before the application can go through. 
IGWDP: Villages are selected for the project should be in a drought prone area 
with less than 20 percent area under irrigation and overall water scarcity; they should lie in 
the upper part of a macrowatershed and have noticeable erosion, land degradation and 
resource depletion problems.  Village boundaries should coincide to the greatest extent 
possible with watershed boundaries, and the topography should offer good opportunities 
for water harvesting.  Villages should be predominantly poor with a high proportion of 
scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in the population, and land holdings within selected 
villages should be relatively equally distributed.  Beyond this, the villagers should commit 
to the social conditions outlined above.  The key factor is that villagers should demonstrate 
their capacity for collective action and their concern for resource conservation.  Finally, the 
village is represented by a village watershed committee that is selected on the basis of 
consensus in the Gram Sabha (NABARD 1995; Farrington and Lobo 1997). 
 
Comments on the Site Selection Criteria 
The site selection criteria reveal a great deal about each project’s orientation.  All 
of the projects share a bias towards working in areas that are less favored 
agroclimatically, although it is stronger in some than others.  Agroclimatic conditions are 
the most lenient in the NWDPRA due to its interest in developing rainfed agriculture. 
The NWDPRA is also the only project that does not seek to work in villages that 





the NWDPRA’s orientation toward planning and supervision by people from outside the 
village, as well as an optimistic view about the process of dissemination of project 
benefits.  More subtly, the approach also leads to an apparently unintentional bias in 
selection of project sites towards more densely populated areas with better access to 
transport and markets.  In accordance with the conceptual framework outlined in the 
introductory section, these conditions may well be especially favorable for the promotion 
of rainfed areas.  In this sense the project’s technical interventions may complement other 
features of the project sites. 
The AGY and IGWDP reveal the greatest focus on social discipline.  In many 
respects the villages under this project are self-selected for collective action.  Many of 
them practiced the required social restrictions prior to the onset of the program.  Villages 
that are not prepared to ban grazing and tree-cutting or to practice shramdan shy away 
from these programs.  The IGWDP takes the additional step of selecting only villages 
with topography favorable for constructing water harvesting structures.   
Another point about selecting villages for success is that in the start-up phase of the 
IGWDP, which is covered under this study, only well-established NGOs were selected that 
were already familiar with the community in which they initiated the project.  That means 
that they were already working there prior to the start of the IGWDP, and many ongoing 
activities were simply brought under the flag of the IGWDP.  A similar situation holds for 
the AGY, where many project villages are led by disciples of Anna Hazare and tried to 
follow his development philosophy even before the project began. 
 
ANALYSIS OF DETERMINANTS OF PROGRAM PLACEMENT 
This section investigates how published site-selection guidelines translate into 
actual program placement in the study villages.  As mentioned above, it focuses on 
Maharashtra due to data limitations in Andhra Pradesh. 
Table 13 presents mean values of variables that describe the villages in 
Maharashtra covered by the village survey.  The data suggest that the projects do in fact 
follow the principles laid out in their guidelines.  NGO and NGO-government collaborative 





NWDPRA villages had the highest.  Conditions in nonproject villages were similar to those 
under the NWDPRA.  All of the NGO-government collaborative project villages practiced 
shramdan, as did 75% of the NGO villages.  Less than half of the remaining villages 
practiced shramdan.  None of the projects had a significantly lower percentage of area 
irrigated than the nonproject villages, but this is because virtually all villages in the study 
area have relatively little irrigation, and also because the government projects target their 
work based on the level of irrigation at the taluka level, not the village level.   
As mentioned above, nearly all projects take advantage of work done by the 
COWDEP project in the 1980s, although only Jal Sandharan advertises this fact in its 
published guidelines.  Only three project villages in Maharashtra—one each under the 
NWDPRA, DPAP and NGO categories—were not previously treated under COWDEP.  
For NGOs, selecting COWDEP villages is sensible because technical work that was 
already undertaken can be made more productive by developing complementary social 
institutions.  At the same time, it makes it somewhat difficult to determine how much of 
the success of the program stems from the project’s current work and how much depends 
on earlier watershed structures built under COWDEP.  It may have implications for the 
time frame required for watershed development interventions when the project expands 





Table 13: Mean values of selected Maharashtra village characteristics in 1987, by 
project category
a,b 
% of villages that had some land coming 
under the Forest Department 
76  80  71  83  86  65 
Overall adult literacy rate, % (1991 census)  53  58  54  46  52  56 
Male literacy rate, % (1991 census)  68  73  69  62  67  73 
Female literacy rate, % (1991 census)  37  43  37  30  38  40 
Village characteristic  All  NWDPRA  JS  NGO  AGY-IG  No project 
Average annual rainfall  578  601  566  593  583  578 
Altitude range  49  67  54  51  44  37 
% Irrigated area  13  24  13  9  16  11 
% of villages located in the upper reaches 
of the macrowatershed 
59  70  47  75  64  47 
% of villages located in the middle reaches 
of the macrowatershed 
23  20  41  17  0  29 
% of villages located in the lower reaches 
of the macrowatershed 
19  10  12  8  36  24 
% of villages located on a highway  4  0  12  0  7  0 
% of villages located on a paved road  34  50  29  42  21  35 
% of villages located on a good unpaved 
road 
24  30  18  17  43  18 
% of villages located on a bad unpaved 
road  
29  20  35  25  14  41 
% of villages located on a bullock cart path  9  0  6  17  14  6 
Distance to nearest regulated market
c  11.7  13.9  11.6  16.8  8.1  9.8 
Distance to taluka headquarters  20.6  18.4  18.9  24.7  22.1  19.5 
Distance to district headquarters  65.6  60.8  61.6  65.4  69.1  69.7 
Distance to large city
d  77.8  56.8  94.7  88.3  65.8  75.7 
Distance to nearest bus stop  1.2  .9  .9  1.7  1.4  1.3 
Number of extension agent visits per 
month 
1.6  1.4  1.5  1.3  2.2  1.6 
Distance to industrial unit  24  19.8  25.4  28.7  26.8  20.7 
Distance to bank
e  6.0  3.5  5.7  9.2  6.7  4.9 
Population density (from 1991 census)  135  162  123  118  131  145 
% of villages with a public health service 
office 
16  50  20  10  0  10 
Distance to nearest public health service  6.9  3.7  7.2  7.5  9.4  6.0 
% of houses with an electrical connection  27  32  25  24  21  32 
% of villages with electricity to power 
irrigation pumps 
89  100  88  92  78  88 
% of villages that had informal credit 
groups  
24  60  12  25  0.0  35 
% of villages that had adequate drinking 
water (i.e. did not need tankers to deliver 
it) 
53  70  35  50  43  71 
% of villages containing some common 
(government revenue) land 





Table 13 continued 
Village characteristic  All  NWDPRA  JS  NGO  AGY-IG  No project 
Distance to nearest veterinarian  5.4  3.2  5.5  5.9  6.9  4.9 
% practicing shramdan (voluntary 
community labor)
f 
54  20  35  75  100  41 
% in which fuel was available from 
government revenue land
g 
40  33  40  50  63  25 
% in which grass fodder was available 
from government revenue land
g 
83  83  90  50  88  83 
% in which tree fodder was available from 
government revenue land
g 
40  50  40  50  50  25 
Notes: 
a Analysis of variance statistics are reported for continuous variables with significance 
level p < .10. 
b Kruskal-Wallis statistics for ordinal categorical variables are reported for variables with 
significance level p < .10 (Agresti 1997). 
c Distance to nearest regulated market: F = 2.80, 4 df, p < .03. 
d Distance to nearest large city: F = 2.84, 4 df, p < .05. 
e Distance to nearest bank: F = 2.07, 4 df, p < .1. 
f Whether shramdan (community voluntary labor) is used: chi-square = 21.9, 4 df, p < .001. 




Another interesting observation in Table 13, not revealed by published guidelines, 
is that in all the project categories, a smaller percentage of villages contain common land 
(owned by the government) than in nonproject villages.  The difference is particularly 
large in NGO villages; only 33% contain government revenue land compared to 71% for 
nonproject villages and 57% overall.  Such land usually lies in the upper watershed and is 
used as grazing commons; as discussed in Section 1, watershed projects aim to restrict 
access by grazing animals to this land.  Throughout India, government revenue is in a 
notoriously degraded, open access state.  Accordingly, the organizational requirements of 
watershed development may be significantly less complicated in villages without 
government revenue land.  Another kind of common land is owned by the Forest 
Department, which uses its own resources to restrict access.  More project villages than 
nonproject villages contain Forest Department land, most likely because they are located 






Econometric Analysis of the Determinants of Project Placement 
A multinomial logit model is used to examine in more detail the determinants of 
which project category a particular village falls into.  The dependent variable is the 
categorical project variable covering the five categories found in Maharashtra: National 
Watershed Development Project for Rainfed Areas (NWDPRA), Jal Sandharan, NGOs, 
and Adarsh Gaon Yojana and Indo-German Programme (AGY/IGWDP—combined into 
one category), and nonproject. 
Explanatory variables: Conditions prevailing in 1987, before the projects began, 
represent the potential determinants of a village’s selection by a given project.  Altitude 
range (the difference between the highest and lowest points, in meters) is important since 
many projects seek to work in areas with high potential for water harvesting.  
Infrastructure variables include the distance to taluka headquarters, the population density 
in 1990,
14 percent area irrigated, adequacy of drinking water availability, distance to 
market, distance to the nearest bus stop, and distance to the nearest public health center.  
Other infrastructure variables are omitted due to high correlation with those included.
15  
The existence of an old COWDEP project in the village is omitted from the analysis 
because it perfectly predicts the existence of a current project, making the multinomial 
logit analysis infeasible. Variables representing social conditions and social institutions 
are whether the village practiced shramdan and the number of communal groups.  The 
literacy rate was considered but excluded because it is highly correlated with some of the 
infrastructure variables. 
Results: The findings of the multinomial logit analysis are presented in Table 14.  
The analysis supports most of the descriptive findings about project selection and raises 
some additional points.  With nonproject villages as the base category, the analysis shows 
the following. 
                                                 
14 Population data come from the 1990 census (GOI 1991b); they are not available 
for 1987. 
15 An effort was made to build an index of infrastructure quality, but it had limited 





Table 14: Determinants of project category in Maharashtra
a 
Multinomial logit regressions (standard errors in parentheses) 
Variable  Project category 
   
Min of Agriculture 
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a Reference category is control (no project); variables reflect values in the pre-
project period. 70 observations. Model is not corrected for choice-based sampling, i.e. 
that the sample is stratified on the dependent variable. Coefficients and standard errors 
are adjusted to account for sampling weights, stratification and finite population size.  *, 
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 
 
All projects have a greater range in altitude between the highest and lowest point 
in the village compared to nonproject villages, and this difference is significant for all 
except the NGO/government collaborative projects.  This is to be expected since hilly 





The AGY/IGWDP villages were significantly more likely to practice shramdan in 
1987.  NWDPRA villages actually practiced significantly less shramdan than nonproject 
villages; the reasons for this finding are not known.  NWDPRA, Jal Sandharan and NGO 
villages all had more communal diversity and more people of low caste than nonproject 
villages, and the latter is consistent with published guidelines.  The AGY/IGWDP, on the 
other hand, had no significant differences from nonproject villages in communal diversity 
and low caste people.  If the analysis is conducted using the AGY and IGWDP as the base 
category (not shown) the communal diversity and population of low caste people are 
significantly lower than other project categories.  The IGWDP requires consensus-based 
decision making, which may be easier with communal homogeneity, and the two projects 
require a ban on open grazing and tree-cutting, which may be more difficult for poor, low 
caste people to accept because they rely on products from the commons for their 
livelihoods.  NGO and Jal Sandharan villages were significantly less likely to contain 
government revenue land, possibly suggesting that these projects sought to operate in such 
villages to make their work easier.  NWDPRA and AGY/IGWDP villages also were less 
likely to contain government revenue land, but the difference is not statistically significant. 
NWDPRA villages were likely to have significantly fewer seasonal migrant 
workers, while AGY/IGWDP villages were likely to have significantly more.  A higher 
number of migrant workers can be an indication of poor economic conditions locally.  
AGY/IGWDP villages are also significantly larger in area; the reason for this difference 
is not clear. 
NWDPRA villages were likely to be more densely populated while others were 
likely to be less densely populated than nonproject villages, but this difference is 
significant only for the NWDPRA villages.  This is consistent with the NWDPRA’s 
published guidelines, which call for working in more accessible, visible villages.  Again, 
this probably reflects a nonrandom selection process.  NWDPRA villages are also closer 
to public health clinics and markets, though only the former is significant.  NGO villages, 
on the other hand, were significantly likely to be located further from markets and the 
taluka headquarters, and AGY/IGWDP villages were significantly farther from the 





Finally, only Jal Sandharan/DPAP villages were more likely to have a drinking 
water shortage, consistent with the project’s mandate, but the difference was not 
statistically significant. 
 
6.   NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY ON 
UNCULTIVATED LANDS 
 
Most nonarable lands in the study region are managed either as government revenue 
land or Forest Department land.  While the latter is managed by the Forest Department and 
access is heavily restricted (at least in principle), government revenue land is typically in a 
state of open access to all users.  Protecting it requires village-level management institutions 
based on widespread commitment to improvement of this resource. 
Watershed projects seek to develop nonarable lands for a variety of reasons.  In 
projects oriented toward water harvesting, the ultimate reason is that nonarable lands are 
typically in the upper reaches of the watershed, which act as the catchment area for water 
harvesting structures downstream.  If the upper reaches are poorly maintained, erosion will 
silt the water harvesting structures, rendering them useless.  So developing and protecting 
nonarable lands is a prerequisite to the primary objective of raising the water table. 
Developing nonarable lands also has direct benefits, particularly increasing the 
long-term availability of products such as fuel and fodder that historically were supplied 
by these lands.  Soil and water conservation trenches are dug to concentrate water and 
soil, with trees and grasses planted in the trenches.  In the early years after planting, the 
common lands must be strictly protected against grazing so that plants can establish.  
After that, they can supply a steady stream of fodder and fuel as long as grazing and 
harvesting are restricted. 
The typical scenario on the common lands in rural India has been one of gradually 
declining productivity due to overexploitation, which in turn resulted from institutional 
arrangements that were inadequate to encourage people to protect and develop these 
lands (Singh 1997).  Historically, management of common lands followed at least three 





insufficient pressure on resources to lead to severe degradation until the last several 
decades.  In others, management was enforced by powerful landowners such as zamindars, 
who acted as “gatekeepers” to make sure that the common lands were not overexploited 
(Gadgil and Guha 1992; Bentley 1984).  While this system was good for the condition of 
the land, it was inequitable, with benefits dominated by the landlords.  In a third kind of 
situation, democratic village-level institutions resulted in sophisticated, equitable ways of 
sharing both rights and responsibilities for managing common lands (Agarwal and Narain 
1989).  Although this latter situation is sometimes presented as the historical norm in rural 
India, there is little evidence that it prevailed beyond a minority of villages.  It is often said 
anecdotally, however, that such systems are still common in tribal areas. 
 
WHAT THE PROJECTS DO 
The idea behind most current watershed project efforts on common lands is to use 
a combination of technical and institutional means to move the supply of products such as 
fuel and fodder from a low-level equilibrium to a high-level one.  In addition to installing 
soil and water conservation works and planting vegetation, most projects today seek to 
develop institutions for managing government lands based on principles of common 
property resource management.  They typically encourage villagers to establish users’ 
committees that are expected to develop and enforce management plans in a way that 
satisfies the needs of every interest group.  In short, they try to create the kind of ideal, 
democratic arrangement mentioned above. 
As described in Section 2, the AGY, IGWDP and NGO projects all devote 
relatively large efforts to social organization, and particularly to mechanisms to reduce 
pressure on common lands.  The IGWDP and AGY, for example, only work in villages 
that promise to ban grazing and cutting trees.  All of these projects also promote “social 
fencing,” or social mechanisms to achieve protection of the common lands.  Their efforts 
may include encouraging everyone to comply with restrictions on the commons, devising 
arrangements to guard them if necessary, etc.  The NWDPRA and Jal Sandharan 
guidelines cover the same issues but in a more cursory way, and unlike the other agencies 





members have any training related to social organization helps ensure this.  The 
NWDPRA and Jal Sandharan may contract this part of the work out to NGOs, but only 
for a few weeks, after which social organization is expected to take care of itself. 
An important feature of project investment on common lands is that it is entirely 
subsidized.  Some projects require a 10% in kind contribution (in terms of donated labor), 
but this is more than offset by the fact that the projects pay above the market wage.  At 
the very least, donating 10 percent of one’s labor to gain a day of employment is a break-
even proposition.  The AGY and IGWDP, along with some NGOs, obtain a local 
contribution to developing the common lands through the practice of shramdan.  
Approximately 16% of the costs should be contributed through shramdan, with half the 
value returned in cash to a village development fund for maintaining watershed 
development infrastructure. 
The indicators presented in this section help identify of the extent to which 
various types of watershed projects have succeeded in developing and protecting 
common lands.  The section on common lands is divided into discussions of four sets of 
indicators.  One type of indicator is the introduction of social fencing institutions to 
encourage protection of the commons, and the other three are rough measurements of 
natural resource conditions, including erosion and conservation status of the main 
drainage line, erosion status of nonarable lands, and changes in availability of fodder and 
fuel.  The analysis of the condition of the drainage line covers the 64 Maharashtra 
villages that have a main drainage line, while the remaining analysis covers the 40 
villages that contain government revenue land, since this is the common land over which 
villagers have the authority to manage as they please. 
 
SOCIAL FENCING INSTITUTIONS 
The most common social fencing institutions are bans on grazing and cutting 





may be another question.  Investigators who stayed in each village for 2-4 days sought to 
distinguish whether grazing bans and tree cutting bans were active or just in name only.
16 
Table 15 lists the number and percentage of villages in each project category that 
had banned grazing, as well as the number that actually imposed penalties on offenders of 
rules against grazing and tree cutting.  A traditional penalty against illicit grazing, for 
example, is to impound the grazing animals in the panchayat (village government) office 
and release them only upon payment of a fee.  Panchayats or watershed user 
organizations keep records of such payments, so it is not difficult to identify whether or 
not such punishment systems were enforced in 1997. 
The table shows the presence of grazing and tree cutting bans for both the pre-
project period and the present.  It shows that in both 1987 and 1997, banning grazing on 
the commons was the exception, not the rule.  Only 5 out of 40 villages (12.5%) had 
banned grazing before the projects, rising to 35% after introduction of the projects.  The 
respective numbers for imposing punishments for illicit grazing were even less, with 5% 
in 1987 and 22% in 1997.  The numbers for punishing illicit cutting of trees are similar at 
5% in 1987 and 20% in 1997.  Two details in the table are particularly interesting.  First, 
even some of the nonproject villages have imposed grazing bans; clearly this is not 
something that necessarily requires a watershed project.  The second is that while none of 
the AGY and IGWDP villages had imposed bans or penalties in 1987, by 1997 50 percent 
of them had done so.  They are the only category of villages with a statistically 
significantly higher percentage than the nonproject villages.  At the same time, the 50 
percent figure is low in comparison with these projects’ target of universal compliance 
with bans on grazing and cutting trees. 
No regression analysis is performed on the determinants of banning grazing and 
tree cutting, because so few villages actually imposed these restrictions. 
                                                 
16 For example, if a pasture is protected against grazing there should be no traces 





Table 15: Number and (percentage) of villages with restrictions on access to 
common (government revenue) lands, by project category, 1987 (pre-project) and 
1997 
a,b 
Type of restriction  NWDPRA  DPAP/Jal 
Sandharan 
NGO  NGO/Govt 
collab. 
No project  Total 
Open grazing restricted, 1987  1 (17)  2 (20)  0 (0)  0 (0)  2 (17)  5 (13) 
Open grazing restricted, 1997  2 (33)  4 (40)  1 (25)  4 (50)  3 (25)  14 (35) 
Open grazing restriction 
introduced after project began 
1 (17)  2 (20)  1 (25)  4 (50)  1 (8)  9 (23) 
Punishment for open grazing, 
1987 
0 (0)  1 (10)  0 (0)  0 (0)  1 (8)  2 (5) 
Punishment for open grazing, 
1997 
1 (17)  2 (20)  0 (0)  4 (50)  2 (17)  9 (23)  
Punishment for open grazing 
introduced after project began 
1 (17)  1 (10)  0 (0)  4 (50)  1 (8)  7 (18) 
Punishment for cutting trees, 
1987 
1 (17)  1 (10)  0 (0)  0 (0)  0 (0)  2 (5) 
Tree cutting restricted, 1997  1 (17)  2 (20)  1 (25)  4 (50)  0 (0)  8 (20) 
Tree cutting restriction 
introduced after project 
began
c 
0 (0)  1 (10)  1 (25)  4 (50)  0 (0)  6 (15) 
Notes: 
a This table is based on the 40 Maharashtra villages that had government revenue 
land both in 1987 and 1997. 
b Figure in parentheses is percentage of category total.  Category totals are NWDPRA: 6, 
Jal Sandharan: 10, NGO: 4, AGY/IGWDP: 8, No project: 12. 
c Kruskall-Wallis test shows that differences across categories are significant for 
introduction of punishment for cutting trees (Chi-square = 11.1, 4 df, p < 0.027).  Other 
differences are not statistically significant. 
 
 
EROSION AND CONSERVATION STATUS OF THE MAIN DRAINAGE LINE 
By definition, the main drainage line is where runoff water concentrates, so it is 
highly vulnerable to soil erosion.  The drainage line is also usually on government land.  
As mentioned above, government land tends to be managed poorly compared to privately 
operated land, so the drainage line faces management challenges borne of both 
biophysical and social causes.  (Out of the 64 villages, 40 have government revenue land 
and most of the remainder have Forest Department land.) 
Field investigators trained in soil survey methods conducted a transect of the main 
drainage line in each village, making several visual observations of its condition and the 
extent of erosion on its banks.  The transect was divided into segments of equal length 





determined by whether it appears to be under control and not expanding into adjoining 
fields; the extent and condition of bunds on the sides of the drainage line, and the extent 
of breaches in the sides of the drainage line.  Each segment was assigned one of three 
possible scores for each of these characteristics: 3 for “good or high,” 2 for 
“intermediate,” and 1 for “poor or low.”  Overall scores for each village were then 
calculated by taking the simple average of all the segment scores.  This visually-based 
scoring system was the best that could be achieved given the resources available to the 
project and the lack of existing data.  While it is obviously subjective, the scores should 
be consistent across villages within each state because only two teams of people 
conducted the transects and the members rotated regularly in an effort to make sure they 
all used the same standards.  Also, the 1 to 3 scale, while reducing the ability to make 
fine distinctions across observations, reduces the likely variation in scoring standards 
across data collection teams. 
Drainage line transect scores are analyzed in both tabular and econometric form.  
First, average values of the drainage line scores are shown in Table 16.
17  This table 
shows that the kind of project operating in the village has a small but statistically 
significant effect on the drainage line, with AGY/IGWDP villages having the best 
average score and nonproject villages having the worst.  (Note that even the best average 
score is only 2.00, indicating intermediate condition.)  The same table shows stronger 
evidence that the duration of the watershed project and the percentage of the village 
covered by a project have a positive effect on the condition of the drainage line, 
regardless of the project category.  This appears to suggest that some kind of watershed 
activity is better than none in determining the condition of the drainage line. 
Drainage line scores are also analyzed through multivariate econometric analysis, 
which is used to identify village- and project-level factors that determine the drainage 
line scores.  Each village’s score represents the mean value of scores for all the 100-meter 
                                                 
17 Strictly speaking, the scores are ordinal, not cardinal, but average scores are 
shown here for ease of presentation and interpretation.  An average score of 2.00 means 
that average condition is intermediate; less than 2.00 means the average score is low, and 





segments of the drainage line, so the scores take continuous values ranging from 1 to 3.  
A Tobit model is appropriate in this case. 
 
 
Table 16: Drainage line transect scores at the village level by project category and 
other factors 
Village characteristic  Average score for condition of the drainage line
a 
All villages  1.70 
Project category   
 NWDPRA  1.78
b 
 Jal Sandharan  1.60
b 
 NGO  1.79
b 
 AGY/IGWDP  2.00
b 
 No project  1.40
b 
Total number of years under old and new watershed projects 
 0 (no project)  1.40
c 
 13 or less  1.60
c 
 14 or 15  1.82
c 
Percentage of village covered by the project 
 0 (no project)  1.40
d 
 20-80  1.78
d 
 100  1.78
d 
Notes: 
a Possible drainage line scores are 1, 2 and 3.  Strictly speaking, they are ordinal 
categorical variables, not cardinal, but average scores are shown here for ease of 
presentation.  An average score of 2.00 means that average condition is intermediate; 
less than 2.00 means the average score is low, and greater than 2.00 means the average 
score is high.  The Kruskal-Wallis test for ordinal categorical variables shows that the 
following variables are significant at 10%: 
b Overall condition of the drainage line varies significantly among project categories 
(chi-square = 8.7, 4 df).
 
c Overall condition of the drainage line varies significantly by number of years under 
old and new projects (chi-square = 8.0) 
d Overall condition of the drainage line varies significantly by percentage of village 
covered by project (chi-square = 6.0, df =2) 
 
 
Explanatory variables: 1987 variables are used in the model of determinants of 
the condition of the drainage line, since its stabilization through soil and water 
conservation measures is a long-term process.  1997 values would not be the correct 
explanatory variables to explain the effectiveness of conservation measures that took 





reflected in the course of the drainage line and determines susceptibility to erosion.  
Average annual rainfall also determines susceptibility to erosion, but it is highly 
correlated to altitude range (>.6), with more hilly areas having higher rainfall, so rainfall 
is omitted from the model. 
Social institutions and characteristics include the number of different communal 
(caste and religious) groups in the village, the percentage of households in the village that 
derive their income primarily from herding sheep, and a dummy variable indicating 
whether the village contains government revenue land.  It is hypothesized that a higher 
proportion of shepherds will bring increased resistance to protecting the commons and 
thus poorer condition of the drainage line.  The practice of shramdan is excluded because 
it is highly correlated with the predicted probability that the AGY or IGWDP operates in 
the village.  The presence of government land almost certainly indicates that the drainage 
line runs through common land, which is more difficult to manage. 
Economic factors include infrastructure, such as the presence or absence of a 
paved road, distance in km to the nearest bus stop, distance in km to the taluka 
headquarters, population density (inhabitants per sq km), and the percentage of people in 
the village who earn most of their income from a source other than cultivation, livestock 
or agricultural labor.  Population density, infrastructure and access to markets can 
increase the pressure on natural resources, but they can also raise the returns to better 
land management.  Off-farm income also has an ambiguous effect; it can help finance 
land improvement or it can lead people to focus their interests elsewhere, making them 
less willing to participate in social action to develop the village’s natural resources 
(Gebremedhin et al. 2000; Pender and Kerr 1998).  Finally, as discussed above, the 
project inputs are represented by predicted values of the dummy variables for each 
project category and the average project expenditure per hectare in village as a whole. 
Results: Table 17 presents the results for two cases, once in which the predicted 





Table 17: Determinants of drainage line erosion status
a  
Interval regression 
Variable  Coefficients in model 1
b  Coefficients in model 2
c 
Whether the village contained government 



































Mean project expenditure per hectare (‘000 Rs)  0.06 
(0.02)*** 
 
NWDPRA  0.24 
(0.20) 
 
DPAP/Jal Sandharan  0.007 
(0.27) 
 
NGO  0.58 
(0.40) 
 
AGY/IGWDP  0.67 
(0.25)*** 
 
Mean expenditure per ha in NWDPRA village 
(‘000 Rs) 
  0.10 
(0.05)** 
Mean expenditure per ha in DPAP/Jal Sandharan village  0.07 
(0.04) 
Mean expenditure per ha in NGO village    0.17 
(0.06)*** 
Mean expenditure per ha in AGY/IGWDP village  0.27 
(0.05)*** 
Notes: 
a 64 observations. Possible transect scores range from 1 to 3. Coefficients and standard errors are adjusted to 
account for sampling weights, stratification and finite population size.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  Predicted values based on the multinomial logit regression in Table 14 are 
used for the four project category variables.  Standard errors are not adjusted for use of predicted values.  
b Model 1: mean expenditure per hectare and project category are expressed as separate variables. F(13,42)=6.64 
(p>.0000); R
2 = 0.38. 





once in which these variables are specified separately.  There are only 64 observations 
because 6 villages have no main drainage line.  The models have highly significant F-
statistics, but both R
2 values are about 0.38, so the extent of variation explained by the 
model is not high.  When expenditure and project category are specified separately, 






18  The dummy variable indicating the presence of government revenue land is 
positive and statistically significant, which was unexpected.  The percentage of households 
earning their livelihoods as shepherds is negative and statistically significant, as expected.  
Most other variables have the expected sign but are insignificant.  These include the 
percentage of people working outside of agriculture or livestock (-), distance to the taluka 
headquarters (-), population density (+), and existence of a paved road in 1987 (+).  The 
latter three signs are consistent with the induced innovation hypothesis that better market 
access may raise the incentives to manage land better.  
When the model is respecified so that project expenditure and the project category 
variables are interacted, all the project expenditure variables are positive, and all are 
statistically significant except the Jal Sandharan/DPAP, which is nearly significant.  This 
lends support to the notion, expressed above, that all the projects are successful in 
improving the condition of the drainage line.  The AGY-IGWDP category has a much 
higher coefficient than the other categories as well as a higher level of statistical 
significance, so these projects appear to perform the best.  For every rupee spent by the 
AGY or IGWDP, the drainage line score rises by 0.27 on a scale from 1 to 3; for NGOs it 
is 0.17; and for government projects the increase is less than 0.10.  Other significant 
variables remain the same as in the previous specification of the model.  A very similar 
result is obtained with the use of actual project dummy variables, except with a smaller 
effect of each rupee spent (not presented). 
 
EROSION OF UNCULTIVATED LANDS 
Field investigators conducted a separate transect covering a route perpendicular to 
the main drainage line, designed to cover a representative tract of the village’s area, with 
variations in soil types, slopes, and land use.
19  The route was selected based on discussions 
with the sarpanch, groups of farmers, and a soil map of the village where it was available.  
                                                 
18 Note that the standard errors have not been corrected for the use of predicted 
values of the project category. 
19 The straight line design of the field transect oversamples plots close to the 
center of the village relative to those at the periphery, which are more likely to be hilly 





The investigators delineated the transect route into separate segments whose boundaries 
were defined by changes in either land use (nonarable, rainfed, irrigated), land capability 
classification, or the extent of soil erosion and soil conservation measures. 
This section examines the findings regarding the extent of soil erosion on 
uncultivated lands in the transect, which refers to visible signs of rills and gullies.  This is a 
rough measure that cannot identify imperceptible sheet erosion processes, but it is 
sufficient to identify any form of rill or gully erosion.  Inhabitants of the study villages 
accompanied the field investigators on the transect to tell them the tenure status of the land 
(private, Forest Department or government revenue).  The transect scoring system is the 
same as in the drainage line transect, with 1=low erosion, 2=medium, and 3=high erosion.  
The score was recorded for each segment along with the length of the segment.  Weighted 
averages of the erosion score for each segment can then be summed to give aggregate 
village-level scores, which can be expressed either as an overall score for the entire village, 
or as separate scores for different land uses and different land capability classifications. 
As shown in Table 18, the mean transect scores for uncultivated land show no 
significant differences across project categories; nor are any other village characteristics 
significantly associated with the erosion score in this bivariate tabular analysis.  In fact 
the scores are marginally better in nonproject villages than they are for each of the other 
categories.  One possible explanation for this is that nonproject villages are flatter than 
project villages and so less susceptible to erosion.  A related interpretation would be if the 
project villages were intentionally selected because they had the most problems, so that 
nonproject villages are in the best condition today because they were in the best condition 







Table 18: Erosion scores for uncultivated land from the village transect, by project 
category
a,b 
Project category  Erosion score 
All villages  2.29 
NWDPRA  2.41 
Jal Sandharan  2.32 
NGO  2.25 
AGY/IGWDP  2.37 
No project  2.15 
Notes: 
a Possible transect scores are 1, 2 and 3.  Strictly speaking, they are ordinal 
variables, not cardinal, but the average scores are shown here for ease of presentation.  
An average score of 2.00 means average condition is intermediate; less than 2.00 means 
the average score is low, and greater than 2.00 means the average score is high. 
b Kruskal-Wallis ordinal variables test shows no significant difference between project 
categories or any other village characteristics 
 
 
Econometric analysis is required to gain a more detailed understanding of the 
determinants of soil erosion on uncultivated land.  The unit of observation for the 
econometric analysis is the transect segment rather than the village level average; this 
allows controlling for land tenure status.  The model specification accounts for the fact 
that observations “clustered” within villages are not independent of each other (Stata 
1999).  An ordinal probit model is used because the transect scores are ordinal values of 
1, 2 or 3.  The observations are not weighted by segment length because that would 
prohibit weighting them for sampling weights and clustering.
20 
The variables used in the analysis are nearly the same as in that for the 
determinants of the drainage line scores.  One additional variable that was not applicable 
in the analysis of drainage lines is the ownership status of the segment of land in 
question; a dummy variable indicates whether land is private or common (government 
revenue or Forest Department land). 
Table 19 displays the regression results.  As in the drainage line analysis, the 
analysis is conducted twice, once in which the project category variables are specified 
                                                 
20 When the analysis was conducted without accounting for the survey data, there 






separately from the funds invested per acre, and once in which they are interacted.  When 
they are specified separately, all the project category variables have a negative coefficient, 
indicating that the extent of erosion is reduced.  The coefficient is significant only for the 
NGO category, but it is nearly significant for the AGY/IGWDP category.
21  This is 
consistent with the finding that these projects are more successful than others in protecting 
the common lands, and also that many of the villages where NGOs operate have no 
common land.  Expenditure per hectare is statistically significant, suggesting that the 
specific project category may be less important than the fact that at least some kind of 
investment takes place.  The only other significant variable is population density; higher 
density indicates lower erosion, which is consistent with the induced innovation hypothesis 
that land will be better managed when it is more scarce.  Infrastructure variables are 
insignificant.  Neither the property rights status of the plot nor the number of shepherds in 
the village is significant, but both are nearly so and both have the expected sign.  
The results are similar when the predicted project category and expenditure per 
hectare are interacted.  In this case expenditure under any project reduces erosion, but it 
is only statistically significant for the NGOs, the AGY-IGWDP, and the DPAP.  It is 
nearly significant for the NWDPRA.  The NGO and AGY-IGWDP coefficients have a 
much greater magnitude than those of the other projects. 
The use of actual project dummy variables (not shown) yields very similar results.  
All project categories have statistically significant coefficients, but the degree of 





                                                 





Table 19: Transect scores: erosion status of uncultivated lands
a 
Ordered probit regression 
Variable  Coefficients in model 1
c  Coefficients in model 2
c 
































Mean project expenditure per hectare (‘000 Rs)  -0.17 
(0.06)*** 
 
NWDPRA  -0.41 
(0.78) 
 
DPAP/Jal Sandharan  -0.34 
(0.46) 
 
NGO  -1.91 
(0.75)** 
 
AGY/IGWDP  -1.18 
(.72) 
 
Mean expenditure per ha in NWDPRA village (‘000 Rs)  -0.20 
(0.14) 
Mean expenditure per ha in DPAP/Jal Sandharan village  -0.20 
(0.07)*** 
Mean expenditure per ha in NGO village    -0.35 
(0.17)** 
Mean expenditure per ha in AGY / IGWDP village    -0.45 
(0.13)*** 
Notes: 
a 174 observations from 70 villages. Possible transect scores are 1, 2 and 3. Coefficients and standard errors are 
adjusted to account for sampling weights and stratification.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% level, respectively.  Predicted values based on the multinomial logit regression in Table 14 are used for 
the four project category variables.  Standard errors are not adjusted for use of predicted values.  
b Model 1: mean expenditure per hectare and project category are expressed as separate variables. F(13,42)=3.56, 
p>.001. 
c Model 2: mean expenditure per hectare is expressed separately for each project category. F(13,42)=3.45, p >.002. 
 
 
Change in Availability of Fuel and Fodder from the Common (Government Revenue) 
Lands 
Information on products collected from the common lands was obtained as part of 
the village-level survey.  Respondents were asked in groups about what kinds of products 
were available today, what kinds were available in 1987, and whether and in which direction 





fodder, fuel, timber, and building materials, and respondents mentioned several other 
products.  However, only grass fodder, tree fodder and fuel were found in more than a few 
villages, so the analysis presented here is restricted to those commodities.  The mean values 
of responses by project category are presented in Table 20; it covers only the subset of 40 
Maharashtra villages that had government revenue land in both 1987 and 1997. 
The table shows no significant differences across project categories or any other 
village characteristics.  For grass fodder, most villages reported that there was less 
available in 1997 than 1987, and this was the case for all project categories except NGOs, 
which had closer to the same amount in both years.  For tree fodder and fuel, most 
villages reported having the same amount in both years, but more villages reported a 
decline than an increase.  It appears that the watershed projects have had difficulty in 
raising availability of these products on the government revenue lands. 
Econometric analysis is needed for more thorough examination of the determinants 
of changes in access to products of the commons.  Ordered probit models are used to 
analyze the determinants of whether a village has more, less or the same amount of grass 
fodder available from the government revenue lands.  The explanatory variables are the 
same as in the analysis of the condition of the drainage line, with the addition of a dummy 
variable indicating whether or not grass fodder was available in 1987.  As in the earlier 
analyses, the model is run both with the predicted project category variables expressed 
separately from the expenditure per hectare, and with them interacted. 
Table 21 shows that the projects have led to reduced access to grass fodder 
compared to nonproject villages.  The variables for expenditure per hectare and the 
AGY/IGWDP and Jal Sandharan/DPAP project categories have negative, statistically 
significant signs.  Where the expenditure and project category variables are interacted, 
the AGY/IGWDP and DPAP variables remain significantly negative, while the other 
project categories are insignificant.
 22  The AGY-IGWDP coefficient also has a much 
higher magnitude. 
                                                 












% villages with different directions of 
change in availability of grass fodder 
% villages with different directions of 
change in availability of tree fodder 
% villages with different directions 
of change in availability of fuel 
    More  Same  Less  More  Same  Less   More  Same  Less  
All villages  40  20  27.5  52.5  7.5  62.5  33.3  5  60  35 
NWDPRA  6  16.7  16.7  66.7  16.7  50  33.3  10  60  30 
Jalsandharan  10  30  10  60  20  60  20  0  50  50 
NGO  4  25  50  25  0  50  50  12.5  50  37.5 
AGY/IGWDP  8  25  37.5  37.5  0  62.5  37.5  0  75  25 
No project  12  8.3  33.3  58.3  0  75  25  5  60  35 
Notes: 
a This analysis covers only those villages in the sample that had common revenue land in both 1987 and 1997.  The number of villages in each 
project category is as follows: NWDPRA: 6/10, DPAP: 10/17, NGO: 4/12, AGY/IGWDP: 8/14, no project: 12/17. 
b Kruskal-Wallis test for ordinal variables was conducted to identify variables significantly associated with changes in fuel and fodder supply.  The tests 













Table 21: Econometric analysis of determinants of change in availability of grass 
fodder and fuel on government revenue lands
a 
Ordered probit regression 
Variable  Grass fodder  Fuel 
  Model 1
b  Model 2
c  Model 1
b  Model 2
c 
































































Mean project expenditure per hectare (‘000 Rs)  -0.43 
(0.17)** 
  -0.71 
(0.37)* 
 
NWDPRA  0.90 
(2.70) 
  7.56 
(2.80)** 
 
DPAP/Jal Sandharan  -2.40 
(1.41)* 
  5.15 
(1.6)*** 
 
NGO  7.95 
(12.75) 
  7.75 
(6.62) 
 
AGY/IGWDP  -5.23 
(2.06)** 
  2.26 
(2.41) 
 
Mean expenditure per ha in NWDPRA village (‘000 Rs)    0.06 
(0.60) 
  0.60 
(0.36) 
Mean expenditure per ha in DPAP/Jal Sandharan village    -0.89 
(0.31)*** 
  0.32 
(0.16)** 
Mean expenditure per ha in NGO village    1.35 
(2.29) 
  -0.71 
(1.39) 
Mean expenditure per ha in AGY/IGWDP village    -2.04 
(0.38)*** 




  Possible transect scores range from 1 to 3. Coefficients and standard errors are adjusted to account for 
sampling weights, stratification, and finite population size.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively.  Predicted values based on the multinomial logit regression in Table 14 are used for the four project category 
variables.  Standard errors are not adjusted for use of predicted values.  
b Model 1: mean expenditure per hectare and project category are expressed as separate variables. 
c Model 2: mean expenditure per hectare is expressed separately for each project category.  F-statistics:  Fodder: F(13,19)=6.27 (Model 
1); F(13,19) = 6.88 (Model 2); Fuel: F(13,19)=2.94, p>0.02 (Model 1); F(13,19) = 2.06, p > 0.08. 
 
 
This finding is consistent with those presented above showing that the AGY and 
IGWDP are particularly successful in restricting access to common lands and reducing 
erosion in the drainage line and pasture lands.  Improving the condition of these lands 





restricted.  Several other variables are significant as well.  Population density has a 
negative sign, while the variables with positive signs include availability of grass fodder 
in 1987, altitude range, distance to the nearest bus stop in 1987, percentage of households 
working primarily outside of agriculture, and percentage of households working 
primarily as shepherds.  The highly significant, strongly positive coefficient for 
shepherds is again consistent with the finding that it was more difficult to reduce erosion 
in the villages with the most shepherds, presumably because access restrictions were 
difficult to enforce.  The positive sign for altitude range may reflect high rainfall, which 
is omitted because it is highly correlated with altitude range.  High rainfall stimulates 
rapid growth of natural vegetation, so it may be that access restrictions can be less strict 
in these villages.  The negative sign for population density either means that availability 
of fodder has declined due to population pressure, or that more densely populated villages 
were more likely to impose access restrictions.  The positive sign for the percentage of 
households working outside of agriculture means either that this caused less competition 
for fodder, or that there was less pressure to impose restrictions in these villages. 
When actual project dummy variables are used (not shown), the result is very 
similar when the project dummies and expenditure per hectare are interacted.  When they 
are not interacted, all of the project variables have positive signs but none are significant 
(while expenditure per hectare is negative and statistically significant). 
Table 21 also shows the determinants of changes in availability of fuel from 
government revenue lands.  Most of variables have the same signs as in the model for 
changes in grass fodder, and most of the same variables are significant.  One notable 
difference is that the NDWPRA and DPAP project categories have significantly greater 
availability of fuel than the nonproject villages, while the AGY/IGWDP villages have 
less.  The finding for the AGY and IGWDP is consistent with that for grass fodder, while 
that for the government projects could signify that they succeeded in planting trees and 
getting them established, but then did not enforce their protection. It is important to note 
that these results are not duplicated when actual project dummies are used; in that case 





The results for tree fodder are similar to those for fuel, which is not surprising 
since trees are the main source of fuel.  These results are not shown. 
The strong finding of reduced availability of fodder from the common lands 
deserves more detailed investigation, as does that for reduced fuel in the AGY/IGWDP 
project category.  Findings from qualitative investigations provide further insight into this 
issue.  In particular, women and livestock herders in many project villages complained in 
group interviews that they had suffered from loss of access to common lands sealed off to 
promote regeneration. 
Herders: Livestock herders in many project villages complained in group 
interviews that they had suffered from loss of access to their traditional grazing lands, 
which were sealed off to promote regeneration.  All of the projects had provided 
employment opportunities to the herders, but they said it was not enough to compensate 
their loss.  This problem commonly arose in Maharashtra, where landless, low caste people 
are a small minority in most villages and the decision to close the common lands was 
usually based on a majority-rule vote.  In the IGWDP villages the decision to begin the 
project is based on consensus, but some landless people stressed in the group interviews 
that it was not feasible for them to stand up to the will of a more powerful majority. 
In some villages herders said that they had been promised that access restrictions 
would be temporary while vegetation was allowed to regenerate.  However, they 
complained that regeneration had already taken place yet the common lands remained 
off-limits to them.  As mentioned above, such inequity is more likely to be a problem 
where projects succeed in productivity and environmental objectives.  In other places, 
herders were able to ignore grazing restrictions, protecting their immediate livelihoods 
but undermining project objectives.  These findings from qualitative discussions are 
consistent with the result in the quantitative analysis that a high population of shepherds 
raised the extent of erosion but also raised access to grass fodder, compared to other 
villages.  To reiterate, this does not necessarily mean that these villages are more 
productive, just that grass fodder from the commons was more readily available at the 





Additional data from open-ended questions at the household level support these 
findings.  Table 22 shows that in 13 Maharashtra villages, respondents’ perception that they 
had benefitted from the projects rose with land holding size.  Table 23 shows that landless 
people were much more likely to indicate that the project had harmed their interests; among 
landless people the unanimous complaint was lost access to common lands. 
As revealed in Section 5, NGOs and the Jal Sandharan project in Maharashtra 
appear to have dealt with this problem by selecting many villages that have no 
government revenue land, thus avoiding the issue.  Obviously this approach provides no 
lessons about how to address the problem in the majority of villages that do have 
government revenue land, but it may be an intelligent approach for agencies with limited 
budgets that can only operate in a limited area. 
 
 
Table 22: Percentage of respondents in Maharashtra who say they benefited from 
the watershed project, by project category and landholding size
a 
    Landholding size category 
Project category  All respondents  Landless  0-1 ha  1-2 ha  > 2 ha 
All projects  26  12  19  26  45 
NWDPRA  8  0  17  0  17 
JS/DPAP  17  0  0  33  20 
NGO  39  29  44  25  63 
AGY/IGWDP  31  14  0  33  60 
Notes: 
a Findings based on household survey; 120 respondents in Maharashtra. 
 
 
Table 23: Percentage of respondents in Maharashtra who say they were harmed by 
the watershed project, by project category and landholding size
a 
    Landholding size category 
Project category  All respondents  Landless  0-1 ha  1-2 ha  > 2 ha 
All projects  11  19  8  10  7 
NWDPRA  4  0  17  0  0 
JS  13  33  0  11  0 
NGOs  8  14  0  8  13 
AGY/IGWDP  17  29  14  17  10 
Notes: 







On the other hand, a few NGOs, such as Chaitanya and MYRADA in Andhra 
Pradesh, have explicitly aimed to develop innovative solutions to the problem of 
managing common lands.  They try to try to build the interests of different groups into 
the project design at the outset.  For example, in some projects landless people are 
granted fishing rights in the water bodies protected by soil conservation and revegetation 
of the common lands.  Unlike in Maharashtra, landless and near-landless respondents in 
Andhra Pradesh unanimously reported having benefitted from NGO projects. 
Social Centre, a Maharashtra NGO, grants fishing rights to landless people in 
some villages including Mendhwan, covered under the current study (WOTR 1999).  
Some projects encourage farmers without irrigation to dig group-owned wells so that they 
have an interest in promoting groundwater recharge.  Outside of the study area in the 
famous Sukhomajri and Pani Panchayat projects, landless people even own rights to 
water for tank or lift irrigation, which they utilize by leasing in farmland or, in the case of 
Sukhomajri, sell to other farmers (Chopra et al. 1990; Patel-Weynand 1997).  And in 
several Andhra Pradesh villages not covered by any kind of project, shepherds lease 
cultivated land and manage it as pasture.  Such an arrangement could be made in a 
watershed project: if shepherds had exclusive rights to grazing lands they would have an 
incentive to invest in raising their productivity, and this would likely include reduced 
grazing pressure and thus reduced erosion.  A wide assortment of such arrangements can 
be devised to spread the benefits of watershed development and, as a consequence, 
increase its chances of success. 
Finally, watershed agencies argue that if their work is successful, landless people 
will benefit in the long term.  In the famous Adgaon watershed, annual employment rose 
from 75 days to 200 days, and laborers’ incomes rose above those of small farmers 
according to an NGO involved in the project (WOTR 1999).  Social Centre found that 
after 4 years of watershed management, laborers in Mendhwan village could find eight 
months of employment whereas previously they could only find three months. In 
Sherikoldara, landowners began to lease land to laborers rather than pay the high wage 





Respondents in this study were asked whether they obtain more, less or the same 
number of employment days than before the project period.  No distinction was made 
between short-term work generated as part of the project and long-term changes in 
demand for labor.  Table 24 shows that respondents in the AGY-IGWDP and NGO 
project villages indicated with much greater frequency that employment opportunities 
had risen, whereas those under the NWDPRA, the DPAP-Jal Sandharan, and in 
nonproject villages indicated that employment had declined. 
 
 
Table 24: Reported changes in number of days of employment between 1987 and 
1997, by project category
a,b 
 
  % of respondents indicating more, less or 
            same access to employment           
Project category  More  Same  Less 
All villages  33  61  6 
NWDPRA  9  91  0 
Jalsandharan  29  65  6 
NGO  43  47  10 
AGY/IGWDP  72  17  11 
No project  18  78  4 
Notes: 
a Findings from household-level interviews; n = 85. 35 respondents who do not 
engage in wage labor did not respond. 
b Kruskal-Wallis test for ordinal variables shows that change in number of employment 




23 Project officials rarely understood that watershed projects can increase 
women’s workloads.  This happens for two reasons.  First, if a project succeeds in raising 
agricultural production, women will have to devote more labor to various cultivation 
operations.  Second, restrictions on collecting fodder and fuelwood from common lands 
forces women to collect these resources elsewhere, increasing the time they must allocate 
to these tasks. 
                                                 





Women had little opportunity to voice their concerns about watershed projects.  
Guidelines for all projects contain language about promoting women’s welfare, but in 
practice virtually no projects created a role for women or addressed their interests.  For 
example, in about half the villages surveyed the actual watershed committees had no 
women members, and most of the remainder had only one or, occasionally, two.  In every 
case a lone woman committee member proved to be a token to fill a bureaucratic 
requirement.  This is not surprising, as an individual woman on a male-dominated 
committee in rural India will always find it difficult to make her voice heard.  Moreover, 
women are a heterogeneous group whose diverse interests cannot normally be 
represented by just one or two women. 
Just as some projects have taken innovative steps to incorporate the interests of 
landless people and herders and give them a role in project management, all projects can 
do the same for women.  A few simple steps that can be easily adopted are to ensure that 
women attend all project meetings (in part by scheduling meetings at times when women 
are available to attend), give them 50% representation in project committees, listen to 
them to find out their interests and concerns, identify the contributions they can make, 
and train them in various watershed activities, among other things.  The findings 
regarding project impacts on women and recommendations for improvement are 
presented in more detail in Pangare (1998). 
 
7.   PROMOTING IRRIGATION DEVELOPMENT 
 
Raising the water table to promote irrigation development is a primary objective 
of most watershed projects operating in Maharashtra, and a secondary objective of those 
in Andhra Pradesh.  The projects achieve this through soil and water conservation (SWC) 
and revegetation measures that encourage rainwater to infiltrate into the soil, gradually 
augmenting groundwater.  Primary among the SWC investments are large structures 





checks” to major structures such as percolation tanks or check dams.  Outside of the 
drainage line, projects dig contour trenches along uncultivated hillsides. 
This section examines the projects’ impacts in promoting irrigation development.  
Data limitations concerning the irrigation potential of each village make it impossible to 
estimate precisely the contribution of the watershed projects in promoting irrigation, so the 
analysis relies on several sources of information.  It begins with a presentation of changes 
over time in the mean irrigated area in the villages under each project category, and the 
change in the number of seasons irrigated on the plots sampled in the study.  Econometric 
modeling to identify the determinants of these changes did not yield any insight, so 
findings from qualitative investigations are presented to gain additional information. 
 
CHANGES IN IRRIGATION 
It is important to acknowledge weaknesses in the data used in this analysis: not all 
of the numerous factors that determine irrigated area could be incorporated into this 
analysis.  In particular, the hard rock aquifers of the Deccan Plateau are known for high 
spatial variation in irrigation potential.  In some villages—or in some areas within some 
villages—the potential for raising irrigated area is quite favorable, but in others it is 
minimal.  Unfortunately no data are available on the nature of aquifers in each village. 
 
Changes in Irrigated Area at the Village Level 
At the village level, the relevant measure of increased irrigation is the change 
between 1987 and 1997 in the percentage of cultivated area that is irrigated.
24  This 
information is recorded each year for every village and stored at the taluka headquarters.  
Table 25 shows that in 1987, prior to the introduction of the current projects, NWDPRA 
villages had by far the highest area irrigated.  This is consistent with their higher level of 
infrastructure, such as electricity to power irrigation pumps and access to markets to sell 
irrigated produce.  The table also shows that during the period under study, nonproject 
                                                 
24 Virtually all arable land was under cultivation by 1987, the total area under 





villages actually enjoyed the highest average increase in percent area irrigated, more than 
doubling their 1987 level by 1997.  This may be due to the fact that the nonproject villages 
had relatively good infrastructure but relatively undeveloped irrigation in 1987.  They are 
relatively flat and half of them are in the lower and middle part of the macrowatershed; 
these characteristics are more likely to be associated with a higher water table. 
 
 
Table 25: Average change in village-level percent irrigated area, by project category 
Project category  % area irrigated, 
1987  
% area brought 
under irrigation, 
1987-1997 
% increase in irrigated 
area, 1987-1997 
All villages  12.9  7.1  55 
NWDPRA  23.7  5.2  22 
Jal Sandharan  12.9  4.8  37 
NGO  8.5  4.0  47 
AGY/IGWDP  16.0  8.6  54 
No project  10.5  10.9  104 
Note: Analysis of variance shows no significant difference between project categories or 
any other village characteristics. 
 
 
AGY/IGWDP villages are the only other category with above-average increase in 
irrigated area; with 50% more irrigated area in 1997 than 1987.  This probably reflects 
strong improvements in infrastructure in these villages during the period, including 
electricity to power irrigation pumps.  NWDPRA villages began the study period with the 
highest level of irrigation, so they may have had less room for further expansion.  Also, 
the NWDPRA places less emphasis on irrigation development than the other projects as 
is made clear by the exclusion of large water harvesting structures from its portfolio of 
project activities.  Villages under Jal Sandharan, which focuses especially on water 
harvesting, had a particularly low increase in irrigated area.  However, this might indicate 






Changes in Cropping Intensity through Increased Irrigation 
Plot-level data provide more disaggregated information about irrigation 
development.  In particular, data on changes in cropping intensity give additional detail 
regarding more subtle changes in irrigated area.  For example, a plot that was irrigated for 
one season in 1987 may be irrigated for two seasons in 1997, but the village level data on 
gross irrigated area would not show the change.   
The indicator for increased cropping intensity measures the change in the number 
of seasons irrigated for each plot in the sample.  For example, if a plot was rainfed in 
1987 but irrigated two seasons in 1997, its score is +2.  This information is collected 
through the recall of the plot’s owner. 
Table 26 shows the average change in cropping intensity by state and project 
category.  Irrigation intensity increased much more in Maharashtra than Andhra Pradesh, 
with a mean increase of 0.35 in Maharashtra compared to 0.20 in Andhra Pradesh.  The 
difference across project categories is significant only in Andhra Pradesh, where plots 
under the World Bank project had the highest increase in cropping intensity.  In 
Maharashtra, plots under the AGY/IGWDP had the highest irrigation increase, but this 
difference was not statistically significant.  As in the Maharashtra village level data, 
nonproject villages had a higher mean increase in cropping intensity than most projects. 
 
 
Table 26: Mean increase in number of seasons irrigated 1987-1997, by project 
category 
Plot characteristic    Mean increase in seasons irrigated 
All plots  Maharashtra  Andhra Pradesh 
  .35  .20 
Project category     
  NWDPRA  .37  .10 
  DPAP or JS  .33  .00 
  NGO  .25  .11 
  AGY or I-G  .44  n.a. 
  World Bank or ICAR  n.a.  .49 
  No project  .25  .21 






Multivariate analysis is needed to gain more detailed information about the 
determinants of increases in irrigation development.  Unfortunately, analysis at both the 
village and plot levels failed to reveal any additional information; this is due almost 
certainly to the lack of data on such important confounding variables as the nature of the 
aquifer.  Regression findings are not presented here due to their inability to provide 
additional insight. 
 
RESPONDENTS’ PERCEPTIONS OF PROJECTS’ EFFECTS ON IRRIGATION 
DEVELOPMENT 
Qualitative discussions revealed that respondents are keenly aware that water-
harvesting structures in the drainage line can raise the groundwater level, thus promoting 
irrigation development.  In several villages they indicated that water levels in open wells had 
risen visibly following the construction of water harvesting structures.  In several of the 
Maharashtra villages, respondents indicated that low rainfall in recent years made it difficult 
to discern the effectiveness of water harvesting.  And in some villages, respondents reported 
that certain water harvesting structures leaked water, making them ineffective. 
As mentioned above, all of the Maharashtra projects focused on water harvesting, 
whereas in Andhra Pradesh the World Bank, ICAR and NWDPRA devoted only minimal 
attention to it.  Only the DPAP focused primarily on water harvesting, and two of the 
three NGO projects also included water harvesting as a major project activity.  In Andhra 
Pradesh, group discussions with owners of irrigated land revealed a good impression of 
the DPAP’s efforts in this regard. 
Discussions in both states revealed a keen sense among farmers of the types of 
structures that could promote water harvesting.  For example, the DPAP and Jal Sandharan, 
for which water harvesting was the main project objective, had large budgets for gully 
structures and they built the largest and most solid, impermeable structures.  The NWDPRA 
and World Bank projects, on the other hand, were not designed with water harvesting in 
mind and so they budgeted much smaller amounts for mainly vegetative or loose stone 





where they could compare the NWDPRA gully structures with those built under COWDEP 
in the 1980s.  They did not perceive that the NWDPRA’s work had much impact. 
A similar issue arose among NGOs.  As discussed in Section 5, projects vary in the 
number of technically trained people on their staff.  Some NGOs, like Chaitanya, employ 
no technically trained staff and focus exclusively on social organization, relying on 
indigenous technical knowledge in the design of their watershed interventions.  Some other 
NGOs, like MYRADA, employ engineers to oversee the technical work.  Similar 
differences are found in Maharashtra.  Not surprisingly, respondents reported better water-
harvesting impact where projects employed technical experts.  In the Chaitanya village, for 
example, the water harvesting structure was not effective because it leaked.  Such a finding 
underscores the philosophy behind the AGY and IGWDP, which sought to combine the 
technical expertise of government agencies with the social organization skills of NGOs. 
In a semi-structured interview as part of the household survey, respondents were 
asked to list the kinds of benefits they perceived from the project operating in their 
village.  Table 27 shows the number of respondents who mentioned irrigation benefits 
and displays this as a percentage of 1) the total number of respondents, 2) the number of 
respondents who are farmers, and 3) the number who are farmers with irrigation.  In fact 
all of those who reported benefitting had irrigation.  They are best suited to explain 
whether they thought project activities had helped raise the water table.  Figures in the 
table show that a much higher percentage of respondents perceived benefits in 
Maharashtra than Andhra Pradesh, and this is consistent with project objectives in the 
two states.  In Maharashtra only the NWDPRA had low reported benefits among irrigated 
farmers, and this is consistent with that project’s lack of focus on water harvesting; they 
are highest for the AGY and IGWDP.  In Andhra Pradesh, perceived irrigation benefits 







Table 27: Number and percentage of respondents reporting that water-harvesting 
investments improved their access to irrigation  
  State  All respondents  Farmers  Farmers with irrigation 
Maharashtra  21  18  23  46 
  NWDPRA  2  8  11  13 
  DPAP  3  13  17  50 
  NGO  6  17  21  60 
  AGY-IGWDP  10  28  37  71 
Andhra Pradesh  9  6  8  13 
  NWDPRA  2  6  8  22 
  DPAP  3  8  11  18 
  NGO  2  6  7  9 
  World  
Bank / ICAR 
2  4  5  11 
 
 
One obvious point in the table is that perceived benefits from irrigation are highly 
concentrated among farmers with access to irrigated land.  There are also indirect 
benefits, such as higher employment demand, that respondents did not refer to.  In any 
case, the skewed distribution of the most valuable project benefits to those who already 
have the most prized asset (irrigated land) is a source of concern to many project officials 
and other commentators.  There has been much discussion of what can be done to distribute 
project benefits more evenly.  For example, as mentioned in Section 6, in some projects 
outside the current study area all village inhabitants share equally in water resources 
generated by the project.  No project in this study undertook such ambitious steps, but some 
of them did try to help spread the benefits of irrigation.  In particular, the IGWDP agreed to 
take up work only in villages that agreed not to drill any borewells, which draw more water 
than traditional open wells and would appropriate harvested water disproportionately.  For 
similar reasons, the IGWDP also insists that no farmers may take up water-intensive crops 
such as sugarcane in response to higher water supplies.  Sugarcane farmers would draw 
more water from their wells, reducing the water level in other wells.  Also, farmers with 
excess water might choose to sell it to their neighbors if they cannot grow water-intensive 
crops.  A few other NGOs mentioned similar restrictions, but most did not.  None of the 





Another approach to sharing the benefits of water harvesting is to help resource-
poor farmers invest in their own wells.  India has quite a bit of experience in this regard; a 
centrally sponsored program, for example, digs individual private wells for landless, low 
caste farmers.  Some projects have invested in group owned wells, but the most common 
experience was that groups had difficulty in working together to manage and maintain their 
wells cooperatively.  This matches the experience of state-owned cooperative tubewells 
(Shah 1993).  In the villages in this study, there were numerous cases of group-owned 
wells, but in nearly every case they were jointly owned by brothers who inherited the well 
from their father.  There was one recorded case of some neighbors (not relatives) who 
jointly invested their own funds in a well, but within a few years a dispute emerged and the 
case ended up in court.  Against this backdrop, most projects are hesitant to invest in group 
wells.  In the current study, only one NGO, Gramayan, invested funds in a group-owned 
well.  According to respondents it is managed effectively. 
 
8.   NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND PRODUCTIVITY OF 
RAINFED AGRICULTURAL LAND 
 
As introduced in Section 2, raising the productivity of rainfed agriculture is the most 
important objective for some watershed projects, particularly the NWDPRA, the ICAR 
model watersheds, and the World Bank’s Pilot Project and IWDP (Plains).  It is particularly 
important where opportunities for water harvesting are limited, as with many Andhra Pradesh 
project locations.  The watershed approach to raising the productivity of rainfed agriculture 
begins with conserving soil on rainfed plots, which also implies retaining soil nutrients and 
concentrating moisture.  This in turn creates opportunities for planting high yielding varieties 
that require more water and nutrients, or, in some areas with black soils and high rainfall, 
may enable farmers to harvest an additional crop each year. 
This section examines the experience of the projects in promoting rainfed 
agricultural development.  Following a review of projects’ subsidy policies for 





project staff and farmers, since technical assistance for rainfed agriculture presumably 
involves working closely with farmers.  It then focuses on efforts to conserve soil and 
moisture, both through improved agronomic methods and investment in soil conservation 
structures.  Analysis of rainfed farmers’ adoption of new varieties and their net returns to 
cultivation follows.  Because of the focus on rainfed agriculture, the quantitative analysis 
focuses on plots that were unirrigated in 1987 and 1997. 
PROJECT SUBSIDIES TO PARTICIPANTS UNDER EACH PROJECT 
Subsidies are a contentious and increasingly complex issue in watershed projects.  
Approaches have evolved over time, with significant trial and error.  In the early days of 
the Bombay Land Improvement Scheme, bunds were installed on some farmers’ fields 
without their consent, yet they were expected to repay the bank for the cost of the work 
undertaken.  They were listed as defaulters if they refused (World Bank 1988). 
In some watershed projects, the opposite approach is taken today; with watershed 
works being heavily subsidized and no thought given to cost recovery.  The rationale for 
this approach is that farmers who benefit from canal irrigation did not have to pay for the 
canal, so why should rainfed farmers who benefit (much less) from watershed projects 
have to pay for the works undertaken?  This argument is really a matter of opinion, but it 
matters because rainfed farmers often are not interested in the measures introduced under 
watershed projects and have no intention to maintain them once the project ends (Kerr et 
al. 1996; Sanders et al. 1999).  Under these circumstances, it is important to require some 
kind of payment or other sacrifice by “beneficiaries” simply to make sure that they really 
want the work and are likely to maintain the assets created.  Otherwise the project will 
simply be a waste of money.  (This problem does not arise in irrigation projects, because 
there was never a farmer in India who did not want irrigation!) 
There are two main reasons why farmers would allow measures to be taken on 
their land that they do not really want.  The first is that some projects install structures on 
farmers’ plots without their consent, although this practice is diminishing.  Watershed 





on-site costs but only downstream benefits, so in current projects measures are rarely 
undertaken in farmers’ fields without their consent. 
A new problem that may lead farmers to “accept” measures they do not want 
results from the fact that in most projects, watershed works are labor-intensive and very 
highly subsidized.  All projects covered in this study subsidized work on common lands 
at the rate of 100%, generating ample employment for workers to plant vegetation, dig 
trenches and build structures.  Even on private land, the typical subsidy rate was 90%, 
and the remaining 10% was not paid in cash but in kind (in the form of labor).  Moreover, 
much of the project work was undertaken in the dry season when labor demand is scarce, 
and in many projects wages exceeded the slack season market wage.  So even if a project 
paid only 90% of the subsidized wage it may still represent more than the farmer could 
earn under other available opportunities.  Under these circumstances it may well make 
sense for a farmer to accept an unwanted structure on his field, provided of course that 
the costs of dismantling it are low. 
 
Subsidy Policy and Practice under each Project 
NWDPRA: Project guidelines call for a contribution by farmers only for work 
undertaken on private lands, except that no single family may receive subsidized 
assistance worth more than Rs 5000 (GOI 1991a).  Specific terms are not mentioned.  
From the experience of the present study it is not clear how the farmer’s contribution 
works in practice.  In the Maharasthra villages, no work was done on private lands, so the 
issue did not arise.  In Andhra Pradesh, work was undertaken on private lands using labor 
paid for by the project, but respondents did not indicate that they had contributed 
anything.  Kolavalli (1998) found that the NWDPRA collected a small farmer’s 
contribution in only one of the four project sites he visited.  
DPAP and Jal Sandharan: These projects had no beneficiary contribution.  Most 
work was conducted on nonarable land, but even the minority of work done on private 





increased the possibility that the farmer would not be aware that the work is taking place, 
but it sharply reduced the incentive for the farmer to “accept” unwanted work. 
NGOs: Several NGOs called for a 10% farmer’s contribution for work on private 
land, paid in kind (in the form of labor).  As mentioned above, however, the wage scale 
was inflated so that employment benefits remained substantial to the farmer.  Many 
NGOs liked to contract farmers to do the work on their own field on the principle that 
this would raise the quality of the work. 
Two NGOs in Andhra Pradesh, on the other hand, required a much more 
substantial farmer’s contribution on private land.  Chaitanya required a 50% contribution 
while MYRADA recently introduced a requirement of 33%.  In some villages not 
included in this study, MYRADA is experimenting with zero subsidies for work on 
private land (Fernandez 1998).  Chaitanya and MYRADA offered lower subsidies in 
recognition that the farmer would be the primary beneficiary of the work and that farmers 
would certainly pay attention to its quality if they helped pay for it.  There was no 
contribution for work done on common land. 
AGY and IGWDP: In these projects a private landowner’s contribution was about 
8 percent, but this figure was inflated because dry season wages under the project often 
exceeded existing market wages. 
ICAR: Under the ICAR model watersheds, all costs were paid by the project and 
farmers were provided improved seeds and other inputs free of charge.  Little or no 
employment was generated as part of project implementation. 
World Bank: The World Bank Pilot Project and IWDP both called for a farmer’s 
contribution of 10% on cultivated lands.  The contribution was in kind in the form of the 
farmer’s labor.  Farmers also received various free inputs such as improved seeds and 
fertilizers that more than made up for the value of any contribution.  There was no cost-






INTERACTION BETWEEN PROJECT STAFF AND SURVEY RESPONDENTS 
Table 28 shows the percentage of respondent farmers from each project category 
that interacted with project staff.  To distinguish among different types of interaction, it 
also displays the percentage of respondents who received technical recommendations 
related to rainfed agriculture, and the percentage who actually adopted some practice 
recommended by the watershed project staff.   
 
 
Table 28: Percentage of farmers who interacted with watershed project staff, by 
project category
a 






adopted a technical 
recommendation 
  Maharashtra 
Overall  30  17  9 
NWDPRA  0  0  0 
DPAP/JS  0  0  4
b 
NGO  44  25  8 
AGY/IGWDP  56  28  19 
  Andhra Pradesh 
Overall  67  53  50 
NWDPRA  56  51  49 
DPAP/JS  58  22  22 
NGO  70  57  54 
World Bank/ICAR  78  72  67 
Notes: 
a This table excludes respondents from nonproject villages. 
b Some projects installed watershed measures in farmers’ fields without consulting them. 
 
 
Three main points are worth mentioning from the table.  First, overall interaction 
rates were not very high.  This reflects the fact that watershed projects rarely cover every 
farmer’s field in every project site. 
Second, interaction was much higher in Andhra Pradesh than Maharashtra, and it 
was much more likely to include technical recommendations.  This reflects the way in 





Maharashtra because most projects there focused on soil and water conservation on 
nonarable lands rather than technical interventions on farmers’ fields. 
The picture in Andhra Pradesh is very different.  Here, the level of interaction 
between staff and respondents was much higher, and most of that interaction came in the 
form of technical recommendations for rainfed agriculture.  Only the DPAP, whose 
primary mission was to develop water resources through groundwater recharge, had low 
levels of technical interaction.  The World Bank and ICAR projects had high levels of 
interaction, almost all of it in the form of technical recommendations. 
A third noticeable finding is that in Maharashtra, no farmers in the NWDPRA and 
Jal Sandharan project villages ever interacted with project staff.  This is quite surprising, 
particularly for the NWDPRA, whose mandate is to promote rainfed agricultural 
development.  Most likely it reflects the focus on water harvesting in the taluka-level line 
departments that implemented the project.  Even so, at first glance it is surprising that 
there was no interaction based on employment of labor.  But this is explained by the fact 
that the project officials worked through an intermediary in the village who in turn hired 
workers, so that there was no explicit interaction between project officials and laborers. 
NGOs and the AGY and IGWDP projects in Maharashtra had more interaction 
with farmers, but the figures are still lower than in Andhra Pradesh.  They reflect mainly 
project efforts to facilitate social organization and to mobilize laborers rather than 
technical assistance for rainfed agriculture.   
A fourth point of interest concerns the percentage of respondents who actually 
adopted a practice or technology recommended by the watershed project on the plot in 
question.  These figures quite closely reflect the figures for technical recommendations.  
In Andhra Pradesh, almost all farmers who received technical recommendations also 
adopted them.  In Maharashtra there was very little adoption of specific technologies. 
These findings suggest that the analysis of project impacts on rainfed agriculture 







ADOPTION OF SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION PRACTICES 
Despite the historic focus of most Indian soil and water conservation programs on 
mechanical measures, soil scientists and agronomists often stress that there is much more 
to soil conservation than trapping runoff water behind mechanical or vegetative barriers.  
Conservation begins with sound agronomic practices such as maintaining soil cover and 
cultivating across the slope to encourage infiltration and reduce runoff.  Accordingly, this 
section examines farmers’ adoption of both approaches to conserving soil. 
 
Agronomic Practices 
Respondents were asked about a variety of conservation-oriented agronomic 
practices, including strict contour cultivation, cultivation across the slope, retaining 
stubble in the plot, and applying mulches to cover bare soil.  Of all of these practices, 
cultivation across the slope was the only one practiced by more than a handful of farmers.  
Farmers indicated that they recognized the value of applying mulches and retaining 
stubble in the fields throughout the dry season, but they rarely carried out these practices 
due to the high opportunity cost of biomass for use as fuel and feed. 
Respondents uniformly said that strict contour farming is impractical except on 
irrigated land and plots steeper than those covered in this survey.  Not a single respondent 
practiced contour cultivation.  This finding echoes the points about contour cultivation 
made by Kerr and Sanghi (1992).  In short, numerous basic features of indigenous rainfed 
farming systems are integrally linked to quadrilateral plot boundaries, and contour bunds 
and contour cultivation directly interfere with them.  As a result, adopting contour 
farming carries high opportunity costs.  In the 1990s, many watershed projects still 
officially recommended contour cultivation on rainfed plots, but in practice this was 
ignored.  Efforts were limited to promoting “modified contour cultivation,” which simply 
means cultivating across the slope.  Project staff ignored the official instructions to 
promote contour cultivation because farmers simply would not adopt it, except on 





Given the mild slopes and small area of plots in the sample,
25  cultivation across 
the slope is virtually as effective as strict contour cultivation.  Farmers indicated that they 
traditionally alternate the direction of cultivation each year, going along one boundary 
one year and the other boundary the next.  Where plots are long and narrow, with the 
long side running along the slope, many farmers cultivate along the slope every year to 
reduce the number of turns they must make during field operations.  This leads to 
increased runoff and erosion. 
Data presented in Table 29 suggests that watershed projects were effective in 
encouraging farmers to cultivate across the slope, particularly in Andhra Pradesh where 
interaction between respondents and watershed staff was high.  Farmers were 
significantly more likely to cultivate across the slope in project villages, particularly if 
they had interacted with project staff.  In Maharashtra there was no significant difference 
between project and nonproject plots.   
Regressions to explain adoption of cultivation across the slope did not yield 
interesting results and so are not presented.  Using predicted project dummy variables, 
the only statistically significant variable is the dummy indicating whether the farmer 
interacted with the project staff.  No plot, household or village characteristics are 
statistically significant.  With actual project dummy variables, the project categories are 
statistically significant as long as the dummy variable for interaction with project staff is 
omitted.  Including that variable dominates the effect of the project categories and none 
of them are significant. 
                                                 
25 95% of plots surveyed had less than 4% slope, and the median size of rainfed 





Table 29: Percentage of farmers who cultivate across the slope, by project category, 
both states
a,b 
  % of farmers who cultivated across the slope 
  All respondents  Respondents who interacted 
with the project staff 
  Total 
observations 
% of total  Total 
observations 
% of total 
  Maharashtra 
Overall  86  65  24  58 
NWDPRA  12  50  0  n.a. 
DPAP/Jal Sandharan  10  90  0  n.a. 
NGO  24  63  12  58 
AGY/IGWDP  21  62  12  58 
No project  19  68  n.a.  n.a. 
  Andhra Pradesh 
Overall  127  80  76  96 
NWDPRA  25  72  13  100 
DPAP  27  100  19  100 
NGO  22  86  17  94 
World Bank/ICAR  33  88  27  93 
No project  20  40  n.a.  n.a. 
Notes: 
a This table covers only plots with a slope. 
b Kruskal-Wallis test indicates that project category is significantly associated with 
cultivation across the slope for Andhra Pradesh but not Maharashtra. 
Maharashtra: chi-square = 0.12, 4 df (highly insignificant)  




In any case, the tabular analysis strongly suggests that projects are effective in 
encouraging cultivation across the slope.  Farmers in villages covered by the World Bank 
specifically mentioned this as one of the two most important project benefits.  (The other 
was the introduction of new seeds for improved varieties and horticultural crops.)  The 
high numbers for both those respondents who interacted with project staff and those who 
did not suggest that cultivation across the slope spread from farmer to farmer, even 
beyond the scope of the project. 
It is surprising that technical assistance could have such a big impact on 





mention it as one of the most important benefits of an extremely costly watershed 
development project.  Cultivation across the slope can be done with zero monetary cost; 
most likely this technology can be disseminated without a watershed project. 
 
Investment and Maintenance of Soil and Water Conservation Structures
26 
Data on total SWC investment expenditure between 1987 and 1997 were 
collected for each plot covered under the study.  It is important to stress that expenditure 
is not synonymous with protection against erosion, for two reasons.  First, plots vary in 
their susceptibility to erosion due to agroclimatic factors (like slope, soil type and 
rainfall) and to differences in their condition at the start of the study period.  Therefore 
one plot may require more investment than another for protection against erosion.  
Second, there are many ways to protect against soil erosion, and their effectiveness is not 
necessarily related to their cost.  Vegetative barriers are less expensive than earthen 
barriers, for example, and agronomic practices like cultivation across the slope cost little 
or nothing.  Despite this caveat, investment levels do provide useful information about 
what both projects and farmers are doing to control erosion, and how project 
interventions affect farmers’ own investments.  This in turn can help policymakers and 
watershed officials target their interventions resources to support the kinds of investments 
that farmers are less likely to make with their own funds. 
The focus here is on soil and water conservation investments on rainfed plots, 
since the evidence suggests that irrigated plots receive plenty of investment with neither 
financial nor technical assistance.  The types of soil conservation investments listed by 
respondents include land leveling, earthen, stone or vegetative barriers, grass strips, 
drains, and tree planting.  The mean value of total investment between 1987 and 1997 on 
all rainfed plots was about Rs 4,475 per ha in real terms (Rs 35 = $1 in 1997).  The 
corresponding value for irrigated plots was Rs 69,900, of which Rs 10,630 was for 
nonirrigation investments like leveling and bunding. 
                                                 





Figure 1 shows the variation in both total investment and source of finance across 
project categories; three main points arise from the figure.  First, plots under NGO/GO 
projects and in nonproject villages have the highest levels of investment, followed by 
those in government projects.  Second, while NGO/GO projects and government projects 
invested about the same level of subsidy, the NGO subsidies leveraged a much higher 
amount of funds contributed by the farmer.  Third, farmers used very little credit to 
finance their investments, but this amount was much higher in nonproject villages that 
had little if any access to subsidies for SWC.  (A few farmers in nonproject villages 
received subsidies from sources other than watershed projects.) 
 
 
Figure 1: SWC investment by project category and source of finance 
 
 
This initial picture of total investment suggests that watershed projects are not 
succeeding in stimulating soil and water conservation investments that farmers would not 










































































costs and sources of finance vary by the slope of the plot.  As shown in Figure 2, while 
total investment cost varies somewhat by slope, the source of finance shows dramatic 
differences.  Farmers invest their own savings mainly on plots with less than 2% slope.  
They use credit exclusively on these plots (not shown in the figure).  Watershed agencies, 
meanwhile, devote their funds mainly to plots with more than 2% slope.  The reason 
behind this finding is most likely that soil and water conservation investments have 
important productivity impacts in semi-arid rainfed agriculture, and efforts to conserve 
and concentrate soil and water may have greater productivity impacts on plots with more 
fertile, flatter soils.  As a result, that is where farmers invest their own funds.  This clearly 
suggests that funds from watershed projects complement farmers’ own investments by 
investing on sloped plots that farmers would otherwise neglect. 
 
 
Figure 2: SWC investment by plot slope and source of finance 
The question remains why farmers in nonproject villages or those covered by the 
NGO or NGO-GO projects all invested more than farmers in the villages covered by the 





























































government projects just selected villages where farmers were less able or interested in 
investing on rainfed plots, but the data provide no obvious indications that this should be 
so.  A second possibility is that vegetative technologies under the NWDPRA and World 
Bank cost less than those introduced under the NGO and NGO/GO projects, but this 
would not explain the small proportion of total investment costs paid by farmers with 
their own funds.  Third, it may be that farmers in government project villages invested 
less of their own funds while waiting for the project to pay for the investments instead, 
which would be reasonable given that government projects pay 100% subsidies in 
practice.  A fourth possible reason is that some NGOs’ higher cost sharing requirements 
leverage larger private sums.  Some farmers covered by the Chaitanya project indicated 
that they could not afford to contribute 50% of the cost of investment, but other farmers 
did invest large sums of their own money.  Perhaps Chaitanya’s subsidy policy could 
have a stronger impact by helping farmers gain access to credit pay the matching cost.
27  
Figure 1 shows that very few respondents in NGO villages used credit for land 
improvement investments on rainfed plots. 
 
Use of Credit for Land Improvement Investments 
The average amount of credit for soil conservation investments was only around 
Rs 360 out of an average total investment of nearly Rs 4500 per ha.  An even more 
striking finding comes from examining the sources of the small amount of credit that is 
used.  About 50% is borrowed from moneylenders, nearly another 50% is borrowed from 
relatives and friends, and a trace amount—Rs 14 per respondent—comes from informal 
credit groups.  Not one farmer out of 239 in the survey borrowed even a single rupee 
from a bank for investments in land improvement on rainfed plots during the ten-year 
                                                 
27 Regression analysis presented in table 32 below shows that land improvement 
investments on rainfed plots yielded low returns: Rs 1000 worth of pre-1987 SWC 
investments resulted in only Rs 14-70 average increase in annual net returns to 
cultivation.  This might suggest that farmers would not take advantage of credit even if it 
were available.  However, the reported low returns are based on the combination of self-
financed and project-financed investments.  Many of the project-financed investments 





period under investigation.  Irrigated plots, by contrast, received an average of over Rs 
23,300 credit, with almost Rs 9,000 coming from banks.  Of this amount, about Rs 4,400 
was for nonirrigation investments like bunds and leveling, with an average of Rs 900 
coming from banks.  This is consistent with the findings of Kerr and Sanghi (1992) that 
formal credit was not even available for such investments.  Sometimes bank credit may 
be tied to special watershed projects so that farmers can borrow to invest in certain 
approved technologies such as contour bunds.  But typically such credit is useless since 
farmers are not interested in the approved approaches.  Farmers have their own practices, 
but banks do not recognize them and thus do not make loans available. 
It is difficult to infer from the data presented here whether making bank credit 
more available to farmers would help stimulate improvement of rainfed lands.  The 
problem is that most farmers may not want to borrow funds for rainfed plots even if they 
are able to.  This may be particularly so for sloped, erosion-prone lands.  On the other 
hand, if credit were made available in combination with subsidies, farmers might respond 
favorably.  In fact, the experience of MYRADA and Outreach, two NGOs in the southern 
Indian state of Karnataka, shows on a limited scale that this may be true (Kolavalli 1998; 
Fernandez 1998; Mascarenhas 1998).  The key features of an approach that combines 
credit and subsidies would be, first, that credit must not be tied to specific technologies 
that farmers may not be interested in, and second, that subsidies must be low enough that 
farmers have to invest significantly from their own pockets or their time.  As 
demonstrated in the next section, this is necessary in order to be sure they are serious 
about maintaining investments that are made.   
 
Maintenance of Soil and Water Conservation Assets  
If watershed agencies succeed in stimulating investment in soil conservation on 
sloping land prone to erosion, the next step is to encourage farmers to maintain the assets 
created by those investments.  Table 30 shows the percentage of SWC measures that are 
well maintained on rainfed plots under different watershed projects, by the level of 





the level of subsidy, so they are not discussed here.)  Investments with no subsidy are 
almost uniformly well maintained, with only 2 out of 82 that are not.  When subsidies of 
Rs 2500 or less are introduced, the overall maintenance level slips to 84%, and for 
subsidies over Rs 2500 it falls to 64%.  The overall percentage of subsidized investments 
that are well-maintained is 74.   
The pattern holds when the data are examined separately by project category 
(Table 30).  One noticeable feature is that the NGO and NGO-government collaborative 
projects have higher maintenance rates than government projects.  100% maintenance is 
achieved for smaller subsidies and 79% on higher subsidies.  The better performance in 
NGO and NGO-government collaborative projects compared to government projects 
suggests a payoff to their willingness to listen to what farmers actually want.  On the 
other hand, it might also reflect the fact that some of the NGO investments are on flat 
plots and thus easier to maintain.  However, examination of maintenance levels by both 
slope and project category (not shown), selecting only those plots with subsidized 
investments, showed that the good maintenance of NGO-supported investments is not 
limited to plots with no slope. 
 
 
Table 30: Percentage of SWC investments that are well maintained, by project 
category and subsidy level, rainfed plots
a 
Project category  No subsidy  Less than Rs 2500 
subsidy
b 
More than Rs 2500 
subsidy
b 













c  31  97  35  77  26  58 
NGO and NGO-GO
d  25  96  14  100  14  79 
No project  26  100  0  n.a.  4  50 
Total (all categories)  82  98  49  84  44  64 
a This covers investments made from 1987 to 1997 
b Real value in 1997 rupees. 
c This table combines all government projects into one category.  These include the NWDPRA, World 
Bank, ICAR, Jal Sandharan and DPAP.   







As mentioned above, with subsidies exceeding Rs 2500 the maintenance rate 
under the NGO and NGO-GO projects is only 79%.  NGOs invest in response to farmers’ 
demands, and where subsidies are very high (100% for some NGOs), labor-intensive 
investments may provide employment for the farmer.  In this case farmers may accept 
large investments that they do not intend to maintain. 
An important question for policymakers is whether the high subsidy outlays are 
justified by the performance of the subsidized land improvements.  This study is not able 
to address the effect of land improvement investments on production and conservation, 
but maintenance levels provide some information about performance.  With overall 
maintenance levels of 74% (only 69% under government projects), subsidized 
investments covered in this study are not likely to be cost effective.
28  A stronger 
commitment to cost sharing will help ensure that farmers only accept land improvement 
measures that they truly want.  More analysis is needed to assess the cost-effectiveness of 
project investments. 
 
NET RETURNS TO CULTIVATION 
Net returns to cultivation is an obvious plot-level indicator of agricultural 
productivity.  Data are available for gross returns per hectare and both cash costs and 
imputed costs of household resources and labor.  Investigators collected this information 
in interviews with farmers for the crops they grew in the year immediately prior to the 
interview.  Unfortunately no baseline data are available for this indicator, so the analysis 
is purely cross-sectional.   
The analysis covers only rainfed plots since irrigation dwarfs other factors in 
determining net returns.  The mean annual net return was Rs 30,589 on irrigated plots but 
only Rs 2,989 on rainfed plots.  Omitting irrigated plots leaves a sample of 246 plots, 140 
in Andhra Pradesh and 106 in Maharashtra. 
                                                 
28 Regresssion analysis in table 32 below indicates that a thousand rupees worth 
of pre-1987 soil and water conservation investments only resulted in Rs 14-70 average 





Table 31 presents the mean net returns per hectare by state and project category.  
These figures show far higher returns in Andhra Pradesh than Maharashtra, and they 
show generally higher figures for plots under projects with an NGO component than for 
plots under government projects or nonproject villages.  However, many other factors 




Table 31: Mean annual net returns to cultivation, rainfed plots (Rs/year) 
  Average net returns per ha 
Project category
a  Maharashtra  Andhra Pradesh 
All plots  1762  3918 
 NWDPRA  712  4133 
 DPAP or JS  505  3849 
 NGO  2935  4542 
 AGY  2255  n.a. 
World Bank clear or ICAR  n.a.  3662 
No project  1565  3492 
Note: 
a Differences across project categories are not statistically significant. 
Maharashtra: F = 1.35, 4 df, p < 0.26; Andhra Pradesh: F = 0.15, 4df, p < 0.97. 
 
 
Explanatory variables for the plot-level analysis of returns to hectare include plot, 
household, village and project characteristics.  1997 values are used for variables that 
change over time since cultivation took place in 1997.  The plot characteristics include 
area, land capability classification (which incorporates both slope and soil fertility), the 
rank of the plot within the farmer’s overall holding, the number of seasons the plot is 
cultivated each year, the present value of land improvement investment it received, both 
during the 1987-1997 period and prior to 1987.  Household characteristics include the 
farmer’s total land holding size, percentage of income that comes from off-farm sources, 
and the number of household workers.  Village-level characteristics include the type of 
road connecting the village and the distance to the nearest market.  Project characteristics 





expenditure per hectare.  As in the village-level regressions, the model is specified with 
expenditure and project category expressed separately and interacted. 
The model is estimated separately for each state, for two reasons.  The first is that 
project activities and objectives vary by state, and the second is that conditions in the two 
states vary significantly.  Government policies affecting agriculture do not differ greatly 
between the two states, but there may be other state-level differences that are not 
accounted for in this model.
 29 
Table 32 displays the results of the econometric analysis for the two states.
 30  The 
model’s explanatory power is low, and for Maharashtra it is not even statistically 
significant.  The only explanatory variable that is consistently significant in both states is 
the NGO project category, which has a positive sign.  None of the other project 
categories have significant coefficients.  In Andhra Pradesh, the number of household 
workers is significantly negative; this is because households with more workers probably 
use more labor, and in this exercise household labor was costed equally to hired labor. 
The number of seasons the plot is cultivated per year is significantly positive, as 
expected; it reflects favorable soil and rainfall conditions that permit multiple rainfed 
crops per year.
31   
 
                                                 
29 When the analysis was conducted for both states together, a state-level dummy 
variable had to be dropped due to high correlation with other explanatory variables.   
30 The Andhra Pradesh model is limited by the need to combine the NWDPRA, 
World Bank and ICAR projects into a single category when predicted values are used.  
This is because these categories contain insufficient observations to include in the two-
state multinomial logit analysis of determinants of project category. 
31 Watershed projects aim to enable multiple cropping on rainfed plots, but 
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Mean project expenditure per ha (‘000 Rs)  -206 
(200)   
35 
(25)   
NWDPRA/World Bank/ICAR   649 
(1400)   
-3161 
(2449)   
DPAP/Jal Sandharan   1310 
(1195)   
-3665 
(2194)   
NGO  5834 
(1618)***   
1869 
(1891)   
AGY/IGWDP 
n.a.   
-2541 
(1905)   
Mean project expenditure/ha by 
NWDPRA/World Bank/ICAR (‘000 Rs)   
-237 
(179)   
80 
(144) 
Mean project expenditure/ha by DPAP/JS 
(‘000 Rs)   
37 
(154)   
-66 
(215) 




(373)***   
1047 
(214)*** 
Mean project expenditure/ha by 




a Coefficients and standard errors are adjusted to account for sampling weights, clustering and stratification.  *, 
**, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  Predicted values based on the 
multinomial logit regression in Table 14 are used for the four project category variables in Maharasthra.  Predicted 
values for Andhra Pradesh project categories are based on a multinomial logit regression that uses 72 villages from 
both states.  14 villages from the AGY and IGWDP are omitted because these categories are not found in Andhra 
Pradesh.  In this model the World Bank, ICAR and NWDPRA project categories must be combined into a single 
category due to insufficient observations on these projects in Andhra Pradesh.  Standard errors are not adjusted for use 
of predicted values. 
b Sample sizes: Andhra Pradesh 140, Maharashtra 106. 
c Model 1: mean expenditure per hectare and project category are expressed as separate variables. 
 Andhra Pradesh:  F(10,2) = 35.07, p < .03; R
2 = 0.20; Maharashtra:  F(7,2) = 1.2, p < 0.53; R
2 = 0.22 
d Model 2: mean expenditure per hectare is expressed separately for each project category. 
 Andhra Pradesh:  F(10,2) = 175, p < .01; R
2 = 0.20; Maharashtra:  F(7,2) = 5.79, p < 0.16; R





In Maharashtra, statistically significant variables include distance to market 
(negative), percentage of income from off-farm (negative), and the value of pre-1987 
land improvement investments (positive).  The negative effect of off-farm income may 
indicate that farmers with more off-farm income put less effort into rainfed agriculture. 
The positive coefficient for the NGO project category in both states is somewhat 
surprising since most NGOs, the AGY and the IGWDP did not focus on technical assistance 
for rainfed agriculture.  However, discussions with project staff revealed that these projects 
place a premium on helping villagers access government services and helping them identify 
marketing opportunities.  These two activities could have a positive effect on crop income 
even if the project staff do not engage in technical assistance.  The lack of a significantly 
positive effect of the NWDPRA, World Bank and ICAR projects is disappointing given the 
focus of these projects on introducing new technology for rainfed agriculture. 
When the model was run with actual project dummy variables instead of predicted 
values, the results were roughly the same, with NGOs always being the only category 
with a positive, statistically significant coefficient. 
 
9.   CONCLUSION 
 
This study began with three research questions: 1) What projects are most 
successful in promoting the objectives of raising agricultural productivity, improving 
natural resource management and reducing poverty?  2) What approaches enable them to 
succeed?  3) What nonproject factors also contribute to achieving these objectives?  The 
major hypotheses were that participatory approaches yield superior project impact and 
that favorable economic conditions and good infrastructure also support better natural 
resource management and higher productivity.  Findings of the empirical study in 
Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh lend support to the hypothesis that more participatory 
projects perform better than their more technocratic, top-down counterparts, and that a 





Evidence about the role of economic conditions and infrastructure is more limited.  This 
section summarizes these findings and offers suggestions to improve the impact of 
watershed projects and other development efforts in the future. 
 
EVIDENCE OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE 
Participatory Projects Perform the Best 
The study examined the evidence regarding project performance in managing 
uncultivated common lands, expanding the area under irrigation, and raising the 
productivity of rainfed agriculture. 
Concerning the management of common lands, projects in Maharashtra taking a 
more participatory approach—the AGY, IGWDP and NGOs—performed better according 
to several indicators.  The AGY and IGWDP were much more successful in introducing 
social fencing institutions, whereas villages under other projects showed little difference 
from nonproject villages.  All of the projects appear to have contributed to reducing erosion 
in the main drainage line, but again, the AGY and IGWDP projects performed the best in 
this regard, followed by the NGOs and finally by the government projects.  On uncultivated 
common lands, most of the projects appear to have contributed to reducing soil erosion 
below what was found in nonproject villages.  Villages under NGO projects had the least 
erosion, followed by the AGY and IGWDP and then the DPAP.  Finally, the better 
condition of common lands on these projects appears to have come at the expense of access 
to products from the commons such as fuel and fodder.  Respondents in the AGY and 
IGWDP villages indicated that they had suffered from reduced access to fuel and fodder 
from common lands more than respondents under other projects. 
The quantitative analysis did not yield strong conclusions about projects’ efforts to 
develop irrigation.  Available data could not capture the complexity of the fractured rock 
aquifers in the study villages.  Changes in irrigated area over the project period could be 
attributable to many factors for which data were unavailable.  Nevertheless, in discussions 
with project beneficiaries those under the AGY and IGWDP were most likely to report that 





of the projects appear to have done much to help poor, landless people gain access to the 
additional water generated through project efforts.  Project officials under the IGWDP 
report that wages and employment days for landless workers have risen in some villages 
due to expansion of irrigated area, but data in this study could not distinguish between short 
term employment under the project and a long term rise in labor demand. 
On cultivated lands, the study focused on project efforts to raise productivity 
under rainfed plots since farmers already manage irrigated plots quite productively.  
Andhra Pradesh projects focused much more on developing rainfed agriculture whereas 
those in Maharashtra focused more on developing irrigation.  Many projects in Andhra 
Pradesh aimed to introduce conservation-oriented agronomic practices, and all of them 
appear to have been successful in promoting cultivation across the slope.  They also 
promoted investment in soil conservation structures such as bunds and terraces; farmers 
under the NGO, AGY and IGWDP projects invested more in soil conservation than those 
under other projects.  Also, these projects were more effective than the purely 
government projects in using their own funds to leverage farmers’ investment of private 
funds.  Long-term maintenance of conservation structures was higher where farmers 
invested a higher proportion of their own funds; also, for a given level of project subsidy, 
maintenance of investments was higher under the AGY, IGWDP and NGOs than the 
government projects.  Finally, rainfed plots under NGOs enjoyed higher net returns per 
hectare than those under government projects. 
 
Factors that Enable Participatory Projects to Perform Better 
What factors enabled the more participatory projects to perform better?  In 
answering this question it may be worth reiterating some of the characteristics of these 
areas that distinguish them from irrigated lands and the most favorable rainfed areas.  In 
irrigated areas, transferring green revolution technology was relatively simple because 
improved seeds and other inputs were well suited to millions of farms covering huge 
areas.  The new technology was so profitable, with relatively little risk, that farmers were 





favorable rainfed areas, on the other hand, the success of technical interventions often 
depends on location-specific biophysical and socioeconomic conditions and requires 
collective action by local people.  Farmers pursue complex strategies for producing food 
and earning their livelihoods.  New agricultural technologies usually incur opportunity 
costs by competing with one or more of the many components of the farm household 
economy, effectively reducing the net benefits of project interventions  (Walker and Ryan 
1990).  Early watershed projects introduced technologies for conservation and production 
without any input from farmers, all on the basis of trials in experiment stations far from 
the villages and devoid of socioeconomic constraints.  The lack of sustained maintenance 
or adoption under these circumstances is not surprising given the difficult conditions 
prevailing in many rainfed areas. 
This background helps explain why people’s participation is the key feature of the 
best watershed projects.  All projects claim to take a participatory approach, but clearly 
the term “participation” means different things to different people.  In the most 
innovative and successful NGO projects, participation means that local people are full 
partners in the watershed development program, with both the authority to determine how 
the project proceeds and the responsibility to help plan, implement and pay for it.  In 
most government programs, on the other hand, “participation” means convincing local 
people to go along with the predetermined project design.  The findings of this study 
suggest that full participation is critical to project success, and this should not be 
surprising given the special characteristics of rainfed areas. 
Some specific characteristics of participatory projects are as follows: 
They devote time and resources to social organization: The best projects employ 
staff trained in social organization and devote substantial time to facilitate collective 
action prior to implementing watershed works.
32  As shown in Table 8, on average over 
40 percent of the staff in the AGY, IGWDP and NGOs were trained in social 
                                                 
32 The need to employ staff with social skills is not unique to India or to 
developing countries.  The Landcare movement in Australia found that recruiting staff 






organization compared to zero percent in the government projects.  Also, the projects 
with an NGO component devote at least a year to organizing people prior to making 
watershed investments, whereas the government-implemented projects never devote 
more than a few weeks.  They invest in watershed works only after villagers prove they 
can work collectively; otherwise social organization may be superficial and will not be 
sustained after project funds and staffs are withdrawn.  
They build each group’s interests into the project: The best NGO projects 
recognize that rural communities are heterogeneous, composed of social groups with 
diverse, sometimes competing interests.  These groups may include people of different 
religion, caste, land holding status, occupation, gender, etc.  Some groups are always more 
politically powerful than others, who may have little or no say in decisions that affect their 
well-being.  Accordingly, some NGOs in Andhra Pradesh organize communities for 
watershed development by working separately with each interest group they can identify.  
They help each group become organized and then mediate negotiation between groups, 
ultimately brokering a watershed development approach in which every interest group 
stands to gain from overall project success.  This approach, discussed in more detail in 
Section 2, is necessary since project benefits and costs may be distributed unevenly. 
Some participatory projects, particularly some NGOs in Maharashtra, devote a 
great deal of effort to social organization but are less careful to address the interests of 
each social group.  In particular, project plans are approved not on the basis of consensus 
among interest groups but by a simple vote requiring a majority of around 70 percent, 
depending on the project.  This approach is easy to implement in Maharashtra with its 
relatively homogeneous social structure, but often it means that the landless minority has 
no say in designing the project.  As discussed above in Section 6, typically shepherds 
have no say in project plans that remove their access to traditional grazing grounds.  In 
some villages the shepherds ignore the grazing bans, undermining the project, while in 
other villages the grazing ban is enforced and the shepherds suffer.  In this case equity 





They work with farmers to design interventions and select technologies:  In 
participatory projects, project staff work closely with farmers to design project 
interventions and select technologies to be used.  This is critically important to ensure 
that beneficiaries truly want what the project has to offer.  This approach requires 
relaxing the strict orientation towards achieving physical targets that most government 
projects pursue, and also that local people help finance the costs of investment.  
As shown in Section 8, greater flexibility in choosing technology results in superior 
performance in maintaining soil conservation investments under participatory projects.  
Rainfed plots under these projects also realize higher net returns to cultivation.  Some 
projects like the NWDPRA and World Bank projects still place limits on farmers’ role in 
choosing their own technologies, and maintenance of investments made under these 
projects remains low (Table 30).  Most projects with an NGO component, on the other 
hand, have taken a much more flexible approach and have better results to show for it. 
They choose the village, not the watershed, as the unit of implementation:  
Since successful watershed management depends on organizing communities to work 
together, the best projects use the village as the primary project unit rather than the 
watershed, which would be the logical unit in a purely technical program.  They reconcile 
the village-based approach with the watershed orientation of the technical plan by 
breaking the watershed into sub-units that are treated separately within each village.  In 
short, they manage a watershed by assembling a set of small-scale plans, each of which 
makes sense at the local level, and gradually building up to a larger scale.  More 
technocratic projects, on the other hand, begin with a master plan for a larger watershed 
and try to make local units conform to it.  Given the complexity of rainfed agriculture in 
the semi-arid tropics, the difficulties this approach faces should not be surprising. 
They screen villages for enabling conditions:  Before deciding where to 
implement watershed development, some of the best programs screen villages to ensure 
that they possess geographic and social conditions conducive to successful watershed 





Favorable social conditions are particularly important given the extent to which 
participatory approaches rely on project participants to help manage projects and make 
them successful.  Also, one might argue that how the NGOs and NGO-government 
collaborative projects screen villages for their work is one of the most important 
determinants of these projects’ success.  The best examples of screening villages for 
favorable social conditions are the Indo-German Project and the Adarsh Gaon Yojana in 
Maharashtra, which work only in villages willing to practice shramdan, or voluntary 
community labor.  Shramdan is a good indicator of capability to undertake collective 
action, which can contribute to watershed project success.  These same projects, as well 
as some NGO projects in Andhra Pradesh, make no investments until the villagers have 
demonstrated that they can successfully control grazing on common lands.  Also, in 
Maharashtra NGOs and the Jal Sandharan project appear to favor villages that have no 
common land, thus eliminating an important source of conflict in designing and 
implementing a watershed plan.  Details of these screening approaches are provided in 
Sections 2 and 5. 
It is important to note, of course, that there is no single critical factor that should 
be used to screen villages for project participation.  Critical social organization skills, and 
indicators of their presence, may vary by location.  For example, projects in Maharashtra 
have selected shramdan as an important prerequisite, but projects in other places with 
different customs and traditions may find that other indicators are more important. 
Regarding geographic conditions, two of the most important are the relationship 
between village and watershed boundaries and the opportunities for water harvesting.  
The latter is of course relevant in Maharashtra, where water harvesting is the major 
project objective.  Relative uniformity between watershed and village boundaries 
facilitates planning and administration.  Selecting watersheds that fall within village 
boundaries is a good idea given that watershed budgets are not unlimited.  
They work in coordination: Two kinds of organizational coordination appear to 
be important in watershed development.  First, NGOs and government agencies have 





and IGWDP, two projects in which government and NGOs collaborate at every step of 
the project, demonstrates that this is so.  It is important to contrast this with the approach 
to NGO collaboration promoted by other projects, including the Jal Sandharan and 
NWDPRA.  They invited NGOs to work for a few weeks on social organization efforts, 
but this was seen as distinct from other project efforts. 
Second, government watershed development efforts in India are famous for 
bureaucratic delays and turf wars that arise because watershed activities fall under the 
domains of numerous departments.  Overcoming this problem is critical to raising the 
quality of work.  Farrington and Lobo (1997) discuss the intricate approaches taken by the 
Indo-German Project to iron out interdepartmental administrative complications.  The Jal 
Sandharan project, on the other hand, appears to suffer from continued lack of coordination 
among departments (Pangare and Gondhalekar 1998).  This difference may help explain 
the better performance of the AGY and IGWDP compared to the Jal Sandharan. 
 
The Role of Infrastructure 
Analysis presented in Sections 6-8 gives weak support to the notion that 
improvements in performance in agricultural production between the pre- and post-
project period were greatest in villages with improvements in infrastructure.  Erosion on 
common lands is lower in villages with higher population density, and net returns to 
cultivation fall as the distance to the nearest market increases.  Stronger association might 
exist, but the econometric analysis suffers from the fact that changes in various types of 
infrastructure were found only a small number of villages, so the sample may be too 
small and the time frame too short to capture the effect.  Also, analysis at the district level 
by Fan and Hazell (1998) clearly suggests that improved infrastructure raises agricultural 
productivity.  This would suggest that the growing interest in India in an approach 
dubbed “watershed plus”, in which watershed and infrastructure investments are designed 
to complement each other, has merit. 
Another reason to believe that infrastructure is important is that respondents 





developing their village.  Many respondents made multiple suggestions; they are listed in 
Table 33. 
As is the case with much of the data collected for this study, responses from the 
two states overlap but have some significant differences.  In Maharashtra, the three most 
commonly listed priorities are improved medical facilities, better roads, and better 
drinking water supply, followed by increased irrigation and improved educational 
facilities.  In Andhra Pradesh, improved medical facilities are mentioned most commonly 
by far, followed by better roads, latrines, irrigation and better bus service.  Table 33 
shows other priorities also listed, including several that were listed too infrequently to 
warrant inclusion in the main body of the table. 
 
Table 33: Priorities for developing the village: percentage of respondents cited by
a 
Priority  Maharashtra  Andhra Pradesh 
Improved medical facilities  38  64 
Roads  37  37 
Latrines  10  37 
Drinking water  35  15 
Irrigation  22  25 
Improved bus service  8  26 
Better electricity  10  20 
Better educational facilities  18  9 
Improved housing  4  17 
Credit/bank  3  7 
Watershed development  9  1 
Veterinary service  8  2 
Notes: 
a Respondents listed multiple priorities.  Other priorities (listed in descending 
order of frequency): employment, dairy or milk collection center, telephone service, 
including STD, community hall and equipment for it, government shop, ban on alcohol, 
vocational training, land for landless, fruit trees, horticulture, tree plantation, improved 
seeds and fertilizer, ban on dowry, community tractor, grain storage facility, weekly 
market, petrol pump, post office.  Large landholders are more interested in irrigation, 
watershed works and credit; landless are more interested in housing, electricity and 
latrines.  No patterns were observed across project categories. 
 
 
While there were no significant differences across project categories, there were 





in irrigation, watershed development and credit, while landless people were more 
interested in improved housing, electricity and latrines (not shown in the table).  Almost 
all the respondents who cite watershed development as a priority lived in Maharashtra, 
probably because they equate watershed development with irrigation development. 
Infrastructure development is important regardless of the extent of people’s 
participation, but there is also a role for participation in infrastructural improvement.  In 
short, people should have a say in what kinds of infrastructure investments are made; this 
is part of the idea behind the Panchayat Raj legislation for decentralized government.  A 
further distinction is that people should also be able to choose between watershed and 
infrastructure investments.  In a truly participatory environment in which villagers are 
equal partners, they should be able to determine whether scarce investment funds should 
be devoted to watershed development, infrastructure development, or both.  It is easy to 
imagine that some villages must be in greater need of improved infrastructure than 
watershed development, so there should be flexibility to make this judgment.  This is 
especially so given the small impact of the large amount of funds devoted to watershed 
development in the past. 
 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE 
The previous section has suggested a number of project approaches that 
contribute to better project performance, and all projects should strive to pursue them.  
Two broader issues important for better allocation of resources to watershed development 
are the need for better monitoring and evaluation, and the question of how much and how 
fast watershed development can take place without sacrificing project performance. 
 
Monitoring and Evaluation 
This study suffered from a lack of good data on agricultural productivity and 
natural resource conditions, but this lack of information has other implications that are 
much more serious.  In particular, it means that government planners lack sufficient data 
to draw firm conclusions about the returns to different kinds of watershed development 





about their performance would go a long way toward more cost-effective government 
planning.  Currently too many funds are allocated on the basis of too little information 
and, as the findings from this study show, the potential for waste is great. 
The data shortage takes two forms: 1) a lack of baseline data against which to 
compare current conditions, and 2) a lack of monitoring data for easy assessment of 
current conditions.   
Baseline data: Most projects collect at least a small amount of baseline data while 
selecting project sites and preparing work plans.  In NGO projects, background data 
cover both agroclimatic and socioeconomic issues, while in projects managed by state-
level government departments, the data are skewed toward agroclimatic factors.  This 
reflects the technical orientation of most government watershed agencies.  Government 
projects typically conduct detailed soil surveys before commencing work and prepare 
detailed land use maps.  Many NGOs may collect similar data through less formal but 
equally detailed participatory rural appraisal (PRA) exercises.  In both cases, however, 
typically there is no systematic mechanism for storing the data and making it available 
for comparison at a later date.  Inquiries with government offices revealed that such 
records are often discarded once the project work comes to a close.  The reason is that for 
both government and nongovernment projects, baseline data are usually collected for the 
purpose of planning, not evaluation. 
Monitoring: All government watershed projects keep detailed records of funds 
spent, structures built, and other physical targets, but such information reveals nothing 
about impact.  It is purely a bureaucratic requirement to limit misuse of funds.  Most 
NGOs also keep records of work done, and again, a small number of the better ones 
evaluate their own work.  The World Bank’s Integrated Watershed Development Project 
(IWDP) provides a clear example of collection of detailed monitoring and evaluation 
data; this work is contracted to researchers at state agricultural universities who produce 
regular, detailed reports on the performance of technical interventions.  The NWDPRA 





Three important problems remain, however.  First, it is difficult to obtain the data 
that have been collected for monitoring.  For example, efforts to obtain such data for the 
current, GOI-sponsored study were not successful.  Second, the data are not organized in 
a common format across different types of projects, so they are not necessarily useful for 
comparison between project types.  Third, the monitoring procedures under some 
projects, such as the IWDP and NWDPRA, fail to address socioeconomic issues or the 
implementation process.  In the future, monitoring should address process in order to 
obtain a better understanding of the challenges and impacts of participatory approaches.  
Common monitoring and evaluation guidelines are needed: There is a strong 
need to develop common guidelines for collecting baseline and monitoring data.  The 
difficult question concerns what kind of information should be gathered and at what 
level.  It is best to keep the data set small so collecting and maintaining it do not become 
a burden.  It would be easy for the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Rural 
Development to issue guidelines for evaluating all projects within their jurisdiction, but 
generating common guidelines acceptable to multiple ministries and even NGOs would be 
more difficult.  Accordingly, a high level meeting to develop a common framework for 
data collection should be a high priority.  Such a gathering should include not only ministry 
officials but also representatives of NGOs and researchers in order to make sure that all 
parties’ priorities are addressed and that a workable, usable system is developed.  A tiny 
proportion of the vast watershed budget in each ministry could then be set aside for 
collecting and maintaining such data in a representative sample of all kinds of watershed 
projects throughout the country.  A common interministerial office could be responsible for 
monitoring watershed projects.  Arrangements could be made to gather data from all 
kinds of projects, including those of NGOs. 
 
A Call for Caution in Watershed Investments 
This study has found that participatory watershed projects managed by NGOs 
have made a significant contribution to agricultural productivity and natural resource 





the other hand, have fared less well.  In fact, for many performance indicators the 
government projects did not perform any better than nonproject villages. 
The AGY and IGWDP, two collaborative projects between NGOs and 
government agencies have performed particularly well, and this appears to bode well for 
the Ministry of Rural Development’s efforts to expand participatory approaches to a large 
scale.  However, it is important to acknowledge that the NGO-government collaborative 
projects analyzed in this study have benefited from favorable treatment that cannot be 
extended on large scale.  For example, as mentioned above, all of their villages had been 
the site of previous watershed projects (as had almost all other projects in Maharashtra).  
In all of the IGWDP’s sites covered under this study, an experienced NGO had already 
been active in the village for several years.  The AGY, meanwhile, was a high profile 
project subject to relatively frequent visits from high-ranking government officials, so 
project staff may have worked particularly hard and development funds for all kinds of 
activities were allocated on a priority basis.  Such special treatment will not be possible 
as these projects continue to expand, so it is premature to draw conclusions about the 
potential for scaling up based on the findings presented here.  However, these comments 
are not meant to detract from the good performance of these projects; resources should be 
allocated to experiment further with government-NGO collaborative projects and any 
other efforts to introduce more participatory approaches to government-funded projects. 
The major lesson to be learned from this study is that most government watershed 
development investments have yielded disappointing results given the vast resources 
allocated to date.  Lessons learned from early projects have been put to good use in more 
participatory approaches on a relatively small scale, but expanding them to a large scale 
remains uncharted territory.  The MORD has worked for the last few years to scale up 
participatory approaches, but progress has been slow and there have been many pitfalls.  
Its participatory guidelines represent a very favorable development, but it is unrealistic to 
think they can be successfully implemented on a nationwide scale very quickly. 
A strong argument can be made that watershed investments should slow down, 





sufficient capacity among government staff to work in a more decentralized, participatory 
way.  However, given that large watershed budgets have already been put in place, the 
focus should be to use project funds to encourage such government reform.  This could 
be done by disbursing funds only when state and district governments show that they are 
making progress in adopting more participatory approaches.  The MORD is already 
taking this approach.  If it can help encourage bureaucratic reform it will represent an 
important spillover benefit that will offset slow progress in the actual watershed 
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